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INTRODUCTION
Professor Adrian Vermeule has provoked renewed interest in the
relationship between the classical natural law tradition and the Constitution of the United States with his book, Common Good Constitutionalism: Recovering the Classical Legal Tradition.1 As scholars self-consciously
working in that tradition, we welcome contemporary attention to that
perennial legal philosophy. Yet in reading and rereading the book, we
found ourselves frustrated with it, notwithstanding the apparent agreement we shared with the author at some abstract level of principle.
And that abstraction, it turns out, is just the problem with the book’s
application of the classical legal tradition to constitutional law. All the
right concepts are there for a sound approach to constitutionalism:
understanding law as a reasoned ordinance, for the common good,
authored by one with responsibility for the community, and promulgated. Too often, though, the only thing missing from this theory of
constitutional law was a law, namely the Constitution of the United
States.
Rather, Vermeule follows Ronald Dworkin in seeking to offer “an
account that aims to put our constitutional order, including the administrative state, in its best possible light, given our whole history—
not merely our most recent history.”2 This is not, however, “a work of
legal history” or “jurisprudence in the technical academic sense.”3 It
is a work of Dworkinian “constructive interpretation.”4 Vermeule
never makes clear how the written Constitution of the United States
1

ADRIAN VERMEULE, COMMON GOOD CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECOVERING THE CLAS(2022).
Id. at 5.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 11.

SICAL LEGAL TRADITION
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fits into this construction. His big-picture account is of “the small-c
constitutional order.”5 This is “not necessarily the same,” he says, “as
the formal written Constitution even in polities that have the latter.”6
The United States of America is, notoriously, one of those polities with
a formal written Constitution; some might even think its prominence
and endurance are aspects of American exceptionalism.
In a coauthored work predating Vermeule’s by half a decade, we
sketched a framework for understanding the relationships among the
formal written Constitution, American constitutional law, and the classical natural law tradition.7 Although our work started out from a similar orientation in the classical natural law tradition as Vermeule’s later
account, we followed a different path and ended up at a different
place. The more conventional path we charted travels through the
Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, the framing and ratification of the Constitution, early treatises, and classic cases
from the Marshall Court. Little of all this figures into Vermeule’s account of our constitutional order.
The fundamental point of divergence between us and Vermeule
is that the classical legal tradition calls for obedience to the Constitution of the United States as not just the law, but also a law—an ordinance of reason, for the common good, made by one with authority,
and promulgated. Vermeule’s version of constitutionalism, which too
often substitutes Dworkin’s hermeneutics for a classical understanding
of law, is attentive to certain conceptions of reason and the common
good, but inattentive to authority and promulgation. With respect to
all four of these elements, moreover, Vermeule’s constitutionalism is
unanchored historically. He argues for “classical constitutionalism”
that is not “enslaved to the original meaning of the Constitution.”8 But
obedience to original law except as lawfully changed is not akin to enslavement that one must overcome. A real law deserves our real obedience, but Vermeule’s version of common good constitutionalism is
indifferent—rather than obedient—to the promulgated Constitution.
That is not good classical lawyering, though it may be a deftly constructed interpretation that fits and justifies a very different constitutional order than the one handed down to us.
This Review proceeds in three Parts. Part I briefly summarizes
Common Good Constitutionalism and provides a more detailed description of four of the book’s distinctive features. Part II critiques Vermeule’s argument in light of the classical tradition’s four essential
5
6
7
(2016).
8

Id.
Id. at 10.
Jeffrey A. Pojanowski & Kevin C. Walsh, Enduring Originalism, 105 GEO. L.J. 97
VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 36.
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aspects of law, namely that it is an ordinance of reason, for the common good, made by one who has care of the community, and promulgated. Part III draws on those reflections to respond to Vermeule’s
criticisms of work like ours that argues that original-law-based understandings of the Constitution are at home in the classical legal tradition. A Conclusion briefly reflects on the choices facing the classical
natural lawyer in the American constitutional order going forward.
I.

PROFESSOR VERMEULE’S PARTICULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM

We begin with a high-level overview of Common Good Constitutionalism followed by a more detailed discussion of four distinctive features.
A. Overview of the Book
Common Good Constitutionalism has five chapters bookended by an
Introduction and Conclusion. Chapters One and Two present Vermeule’s “positive vision of common good constitutionalism, both generally and as an approach to our own constitutional order in particular.”9 This two-chapter exposition of the positive case for common
good constitutionalism maps onto an essential distinction that Vermeule highlights at the outset. This is the distinction between “(1)
general claims about constitutionalism ordered to the common good,”
and “(2) specific constructive interpretations of a given constitutional
order that aim to put that order, as it develops over time, in its best
light.”10
These generic and particular levels of discussing constitutions and
the common good are detachable by design. According to Vermeule,
his “particular interpretation of our own constitutional order . . . is
separable from the general claims about the nature and principles of
constitutionalism also offered here.”11 This detachability is the basis of
Vermeule’s assurance that “[o]ne may subscribe to the general framework of common good constitutional interpretation without subscribing to the full, particular interpretation of the path of American public
law that I have laid out.”12
Chapter One presents his generic understanding: “a general, positive definition of the common good, a sketch of common good constitutionalism, and an account of its basic contours, premises, and

9
10
11
12

Id. at 21.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id.
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commitments.”13 Although this chapter is devoted to common good
constitutionalism in general, Vermeule’s particular interpretation of
the American constitutional order begins to emerge with his assertion
that “[t]he sweeping generalities and famous ambiguities of our Constitution afford ample space for substantive moral readings that promote peace, justice, abundance, health, and safety, by means of just
authority, solidarity, and subsidiarity.”14 This follows after a brief discussion of the power of state and federal governments in the United
States to act for the general welfare.15 Vermeule dismisses as a “complication . . . chronically exaggerated by originalists and libertarians . . . the distribution of powers between national and state governments.”16 Although the Supreme Court has denied that the federal
government has a “general police power,” that denial “was always in
tension with the McCulloch v. Maryland principle that enumerated powers should be expansively construed over time to accommodate changing circumstances.”17 Through “a development and translation of the
original constitutional scheme to new circumstances,” “the federal
government for all intents and purposes has acquired by prescription,
over time, a de facto police power.”18
Chapter Two turns to his particular account of “The Classical Legal Tradition in America.”19 This chapter has two parts. First is a highlevel historical sketch “beginning with the ius commune—the rich stew
of Roman law, canon law, and other legal sources that formed the matrix within which European legal systems developed—and its relationship to Anglo-American law.”20 The second part of Chapter Two discusses a trio of illustrative cases: (1) three opinions from Lochner v. New
York (a 1905 decision of the Supreme Court of the United States);21 (2)
two opinions from Riggs v. Palmer (an 1889 decision of the New York
Court of Appeals);22 and (3) an opinion for the Court in United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (a 1936 opinion for the Supreme Court of
the United States authored by Justice Sutherland).23

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Id. at 21.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 32–34.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 33 (citing 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)).
Id. at 34.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 60–71 (citing 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
Id. at 71–84 (citing 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889)).
Id. at 84–89 (citing 299 U.S. 304 (1936)).
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That is it for Vermeule’s case-in-chief. The next two Chapters shift
to a critique of purported rivals—“positivist originalism”24 in Chapter
Three and progressive living constitutionalism in Chapter Four. In
Vermeule’s telling, these theories are rivals of each other, but not of
the classical legal tradition, which he describes as separated by a wide
gulf from these approaches.25
Chapter Five adumbrates potential applications. These sketches
are just “suggestive illustrations to begin a project that will work itself
out over time.”26 Substantive topics covered include: arbitrary-and-capricious review, deference doctrines in administrative law, state sovereignty, statutory interpretation, free speech law, obscenity, blasphemy,
and standing in environmental law matters.27 Vermeule discusses several Supreme Court cases related to the wide variety of topics canvassed
in the chapter, though he does not go into any single case at length.28
B. Four Distinctive Features
We move now from a high-level overview of the book as a whole
to some distinctive features of Vermeule’s particular constitutionalism.
1. Neither Legal History nor Academic Jurisprudence, but
Dworkinian Fit and Justification
A first distinctive feature of Common Good Constitutionalism is its
methodologically Dworkinian interpretivism. According to Vermeule,
the book is neither “jurisprudence in the technical academic sense”
nor “a work of legal history.”29 Rather, Vermeule presents his as “an
account that aims to put our constitutional order, including the administrative state, in its best possible light, given our whole history—
not merely our most recent history.”30 He writes that he limits himself
“to the terms of [his] professional competence, the ordinary work of
the civil lawyer.”31 It would be a mistake to fully credit this modest selfdescription, though. Common Good Constitutionalism is, emphatically,
an ambitious work of contemporary constitutional theory.32 Vermeule
24 Id. at 109.
25 Id. at 17.
26 Id. at 134.
27 Id. at 147–78.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 4.
30 Id. at 5.
31 Id. at 29.
32 In responding to a critical review by law professors William Baude and Stephen
Sachs, Vermeule describes Common Good Constitutionalism as “not a work of jurisprudence,”
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self-consciously develops his arguments by reference to what he describes as Ronald Dworkin’s methodological criteria of “fit” and “justification.”33 In Vermeule’s view, this method is detachable from
Dworkin’s moral commitments and priorities.34 Vermeule asserts that
“[t]he principal use [he makes] of Dworkin is negative, invoking him
as the unsurpassed modern critic of positivism and originalism in Anglophone legal theory.”35
More affirmatively, Vermeule presents his book as a recovery of
“the classical legal tradition” for American public law. This tradition
is a given for his argument and he does not purport to make a novel
contribution to classical legal jurisprudence. Rather, he offers a constructive interpretation of American legal practices to surface the classical legal tradition as an implicit structuring framework that puts the
American constitutional order today in its best light. Vermeule claims
that this framework is everywhere to be found once one knows what to
look for, but has simply been neglected because “American public law
suffers from a terrible amnesia.”36 Accordingly, while he “draw[s] on

but rather “an argument within constitutional theory, an argument with both a general and
a particular part.” Adrian Vermeule, The Bourbons of Jurisprudence, IUS ET IUSTITIUM (Aug.
15, 2022) (footnote omitted), https://iusetiustitium.com/the-bourbons-of-jurisprudence/
[https://perma.cc/AB25-SXSH]. Vermeule’s Harvard Law School colleague, Professor Jack
Goldsmith, describes the book in a back-cover blurb as “the most important book of American constitutional theory in many decades.” Inside the front cover, University of Notre
Dame political philosopher Professor Patrick Deneen describes Common Good Constitutionalism as “the most important and original book on constitutional theory for this generation.” The book’s claimed occupation of the high precincts of constitutional theory also
frames Vermeule’s coauthored response to criticisms advanced by Chief Judge William
Pryor of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. See Conor Casey &
Adrian Vermeule, Argument by Slogan, HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y PER CURIAM, Spring 2022,
at 1 (attacking Judge Pryor’s criticisms as illustrating “occupational hazards for the judgeturned-occasional-theorist”).
33 See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 69 (asserting that “one might see the common good
framework as Dworkinism-plus-deference, just with a better account of justification”). Vermeule does not explain what he means by Dworkinian “fit” in Common Good Constitutionalism, but the way that he approaches fit and justification in the book seems consistent with
the use he made of these Dworkinian criteria in Adrian Vermeule, Essay, Deference and Due
Process, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1890 (2016). In that Essay, Vermeule purported to operate “[i]n
a Dworkinian spirit” by presenting a “theory [that] attempts to combine justification, the
best account of the principles underlying the precedents, with fit, a coherentist account of
the law’s path in recent decades.” Id. at 1894.
34 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 5–6 (rejecting Dworkin’s “liberal theory of rights, as
trumps over collective interests”).
35 Id. at 5–6.
36 Id. at 1.
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jurisprudential ideas as necessary,” he says he has “nothing original to
say in that regard.”37
2. Not the Formal Written Constitution, but the “Small-c
Constitutional Order”
A second important feature of Vermeule’s constitutionalism is a
specification of the first. The Dworkinian interpretive account that he
provides is not an interpretation of the formal written Constitution of
the United States as a legal instrument. Rather, Vermeule’s is an interpretation of the contemporary American constitutional order more
generally. Vermeule explains in his introduction that the “particular
part” of Common Good Constitutionalism presupposes and incorporates
by reference from his previous work “a particular constructive interpretation that fits-and-justifies our own developing constitutional order.”38 There and elsewhere in the book, Vermeule describes his
Dworkinian interpretation to be an account of “the American small-c
constitutional order,” as distinguished from the formal written Constitution.39
In discussing the limits of generic common good constitutionalism, for example, Vermeule writes that “[t]he common good in its capacity as the fundamental end of temporal government shapes and
constrains, but does not fully determine, the nature of institutions and
the allocation of lawmaking authority between and among them in any
given polity.”40 These matters of institutional design and authority allocation are “left for specification that gives concrete content to the
operative, small-c constitution (which is not necessarily the same as the
formal written Constitution even in polities that have the latter).”41
37 Id. at 4; see also Conor Casey, “Common-Good Constitutionalism” and the New Battle over
Constitutional Interpretation in the United States, 2021 PUB. L. 765, 772 (“It should be obvious
that none of the arguments that post-liberals [like Vermeule] direct against economic, social and political liberalism, or for the common good, is original.”).
38 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 11.
39 Id. at 11; see also id. at 87 (“The shockingly anti-originalist idea that ‘[t]he Union
existed before the Constitution’ may be one of the most consequential sentences ever to
appear in the United States Reports—at least for those who overlook the difference between
our small-c constitutional order and the written text of the Constitution and its original
understanding.” (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317
(1936)); id. at 158 (“The so-called sovereignty of the states is best understood as a constitutional principle of respect and comity that the highest authority should take into account,
out of prudent respect for legal justice and small-c constitutional arrangements. But like
other constitutional principles, it has dimensions of both scope and weight, and is subject
to reasonable determination by public authority ordering it to the common good.”).
40 Id. at 10.
41 Id.
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This emphasis on the “small-c” constitutional order also features in his
account of existing institutional allocations of authority, such as
“broad deference to legislatures on social and economic legislation,”
“broad delegations from legislatures to the executive,” and “a strong
legal principle of deference . . . to the institutional presidency and administrative tribunals.”42 All of these principles are Dworkinian “interpretations” of the “small-c constitutional order.”
3. Not Lex, but Ius
A third distinctive feature of Vermeule’s recovery project in Common Good Constitutionalism is more classical than contemporary. Vermeule’s Dworkinian interpretive account of the American constitutional order relies at root on a distinction between lex and ius as “two
senses of ‘law.’”43 “[T]he role of ius, instead of or in addition to lex” is
a leading theme.44 He deploys this distinction at the book’s beginning,
at its end, and many places in between.
As Vermeule uses these terms, what initially seems to be one distinction in fact turns out to be many. Introducing lex and ius in Common Good Constitutionalism, Vermeule writes: “Lex is the enacted positive law, such as a statute. Ius is the overall body of law generally, including and subsuming lex but transcending it, and containing general
principles of jurisprudence and legal justice.”45
This passage establishes Vermeule’s use of “lex” as “enacted positive law, such as a statute.” It also introduces two different senses of
ius. First is “the overall body of law generally, including and subsuming
lex but transcending it.” This is the sense of ius captured in the familiar
phrase “corpus juris.” Second is that part of “the overall body of law
generally” (or corpus juris) that consists of “general principles of jurisprudence and legal justice.” In Vermeule’s taxonomy, then, “ius” as
“the overall body of law generally” refers to a corpus juris comprised of
(i) lex, and (ii) ius in the “general principles of jurisprudence and legal
justice” sense.
Further down on the same page, Vermeule deploys a third sense
of “ius” and a second description of lex. The third sense of ius appears
42 See id. at 11 (“[T]he American small-c constitutional order has come to feature
broad deference to legislatures on social and economic legislation and broad delegations
from legislatures to the executive.”); id. at 12–13 (“A strong legal principle of deference by
courts to the determinations of legislatures was part and parcel of our law from the beginning. One of my particular claims is that our small-c constitutional order developed over
time to extend this principle to the institutional presidency and administrative tribunals.”).
43 Id. at 3.
44 See id. at 134 (identifying this as a theme of the book).
45 Id. at 4.
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in Vermeule’s explanation of “rights” within the classical legal tradition. “In this tradition,” Vermeule states, “‘rights’ very much exist, but
they are not defined in the essentially individualist, autonomy-based,
and libertarian fashion familiar today. Instead ‘rights’ are corollaries
of justice, which is the constant aim of giving every man his due.”46
Vermeule’s third sense of ius, then, refers to the object of an act of
justice: “Ius is what is due to every person, and in this sense, but only
this sense, includes rights.”47
Vermeule’s second description of lex is broader than his first “enacted positive law” description. In setting his outlook apart from that
of “progressives and originalists,” Vermeule asserts that “[b]oth [of
those other] camps . . . attempt, in different ways, to reduce all law to
positive law adopted by officials; for them, all law is in this sense lex.”48
The verbal difference between “enacted positive law” and “positive law
adopted by officials” may seem slight. But “positive law adopted by
officials” is potentially much broader because it could encompass customary positive law adopted by, say, judges. Much of American constitutional law is customary positive law. Whether Vermeule classifies
such law as ius or lex therefore matters a lot not only for understanding
his version of common good constitutionalism but also for judging his
claims about the absence of ius in constitutional originalism.
Another reason for clarifying what Vermeule means by ius and lex
is to help place our written Constitution itself in his legal taxonomy.
As we explain below, the Constitution is lex because it is an enacted
positive law that meets all the essential requirements for a valid law.
But Vermeule is surprisingly unclear in Common Good Constitutionalism
about whether the Constitution is lex. On the one hand, Vermeule
treats valid positive law as a determination of the natural law, and he
distinguishes “determination of the constitution” from “determination
within or under the constitution.49 Vermeule describes “determination” as “the process of giving content to a general principle drawn
from a higher source of law, making it concrete in application to particular local circumstances or problems.”50
And he explains

46 Id.
47 Id. The “object of an act of justice” formulation is ours, not Vermeule’s, but we
think it best captures how he means to make use of the classical legal tradition in referring
to “rights” as “corollaries of justice.” Id. Our formulation is tied to justice as a virtue.
Although Vermeule relays the classical conception of justice as “the constant aim of giving
every man his due,” he does not analyze this conception within its classical framework,
which is as a virtue.
48 Id.
49 See id. at 9–11.
50 Id. at 9.
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determination of the constitution as the specification of matters such
as “the nature of institutions and the allocation of lawmaking authority
between and among them in any given polity.”51 This would seem to
describe the written Constitution. But Vermeule tamps down this inference. He describes this “determination of the constitution” as
“specification that gives concrete content to the operative, small-c constitution (which is not necessarily the same as the formal written Constitution
even in polities that have the latter).”52 In discussing the constitutional
origins of the United States later in the book, further, Vermeule asserts
that “the American constitutional order rests, not upon positive written law, but upon the ius gentium.”53 All of this leaves it unclear at best
whether Vermeule acknowledges that the Constitution is lex, an enacted positive law. As we explain below, there is a right way for lawyers
operating in the classical natural law tradition to interpret valid lex. It
therefore matters to one’s assessment of Common Good Constitutionalism
not only whether the Constitution is lex (it is), but also whether Vermeule understands and accepts that the Constitution is lex (does he?).
4. Not Progressive, but Developing
A fourth feature that defines Vermeule’s constitutionalism is the
manner in which he purports to distinguish his particular version of
common good constitutionalism as developing, in contrast with “progressive.” “Under developing constitutionalism,” Vermeule writes,
“the fundamental background principles of the constitutional order,
derived from the natural law and the law of nations and then incorporated (by determination) into the positive law, remain constant over
time.”54 This description of developing constitutionalism seems like it
could be an originalist approach that recognizes the Constitution as lex
in which the fundamental background principles that are “incorporated (by determination) into the positive law, remain constant over
time.”55 As we have seen, though, Vermeule (1) purports to offer an
interpretation of the constitutional order rather than the Constitution,
(2) does not clearly acknowledge the Constitution as an enacted positive law, and (3) emphasizes the unchangingness of “background principles” rather than the endurance of the positive legal determinations of
51 Id. at 10.
52 Id. (second emphasis added).
53 Id. at 85. This claim that the American constitutional order does not rest upon
positive written law is essential to his overall account because “[o]nly the classical perspective can explain this [i.e., resting upon the ius gentium rather than positive written law],
which amounts to a grave problem for positivist originalism.” Id.
54 Id. at 121.
55 Id.
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those principles.56 According to Vermeule, the purpose of his common good constitutionalism “is to preserve the rational principles of the
constitutional order as the circumstances of the political, social, and economic environment change.”57 He asserts that developing constitutionalism “posits that law has . . . an objective integrity that transcends
the particulars of any given constitutional order.”58
“To distinguish developing constitutionalism from progressive
constitutionalism,” Vermeule notes, “one needs an account of which
developments are genuine and which are corrupt.”59 He draws on “the
famous treatment of the development of doctrine by St. John Henry
Newman” for this purpose.60 Vermeule explains that “[f]or Newman,
development was the process by which enduring principles, themselves
unchanging, could find fresh applications in changing circumstances,
and by so doing could unfold their real natures.”61 Vermeule writes:
Newman articulated seven “notes” of genuine development, as opposed to corruption: (1) “preservation of type,” which in his language means unity of external expression; (2) “continuity of principles”; (3) “power of assimilation”; (4) “logical sequence”; (5)
“anticipation of its future”; (6) “conservative action”; and (7)
“chronic vigor.”62

Vermeule explains that, for Newman, these “notes” are “markers
or indicators that the later doctrine is essentially continuous with the
earlier one and grows out of it.”63 Vermeule contrasts development of
doctrine in this sense from the purported view of progressive living
constitutionalism “that the fundamental constitutional principles of
the past are themselves seen to have been benighted, and therefore
must be overcome.”64 For Vermeule, by contrast, “those [fundamental
constitutional principles of the past] are to be tended and developed
into full growth.”65 Straying somewhat from the ordinary work of the
civil lawyer, Vermeule likens progressive constitutionalism to “modernism in theology, which urges evolution of principles themselves rather
than faithful applications of them in different circumstances that
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Id. at 127.
Id. at 122 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 123.
Id.
Id. (quoting JOHN HENRY CARDINAL NEWMAN, AN ESSAY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF
CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE 171, 178, 185, 189, 195, 199, 203 (Longmans, Green, & Co., 14th
impression 1909) (1845)).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 123–24.
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present themselves over time.”66 By contrast, Vermeule asserts that
“[a]s circumstances change restlessly over time, principles must develop—in Newman’s sense—precisely in order to retain their enduring, inherent shape.”67
As earlier noted, Vermeule’s recourse to unchanging principles
that are “incorporated (by determination) into the positive law” and
“remain constant over time”68 would seem to render his approach capable of being understood as an account of American constitutional
originalism grounded in the classical natural law tradition. In a 2016
article titled Enduring Originalism, we previously provided just such an
account, one that—anticipating Vermeule’s later-developed common
good constitutionalism—explicitly includes the categories of authorized developments and unauthorized departures.69 We did not rely on
St. John Henry Newman, but did offer a criterion for authorized developments very similar to Newman’s concept of “preservation of type.”
The central criterion was whether the legal development was consistent with or authorized by the original law of the Constitution, or
rather a departure that contravenes the original law.
Vermeule does not address this aspect of our natural law–
grounded originalism, but he does present a number of criticisms culminating in the assertion that “views that attempt to fuse the common
good with originalism, however appealing they may seem at a political
and rhetorical level, are intrinsically unstable, because they attempt to
combine an essentially positivist approach with the classical approach.”70 Whatever he means by instability or “essentially positivist,”
the view we set out in Enduring Originalism explicitly disavowed positivism in the course of explaining the Constitution as positive law.71 This,
rejection of positivism is also a feature of our earlier account that Vermeule’s current approach converges upon.72

66 Id. at 124.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 121.
69 See Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 7.
70 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 116.
71 See Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 7, at 108–16 (describing the limits of positivist
legal theories like Hart’s, Baude’s, and Sachs’s, which understand social practices like law
only in terms of social facts without attending to the moral point or telos of the practice).
72 Compare, e.g., Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 7, at 117 (“To understand the importance of positivity—the need for human-created law despite its imperfections—we must
go beyond positivism in theorizing about constitutional interpretation.”), with, e.g., VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 18 (“Properly speaking, the classical approach to law is not an opponent or alternative to originalism or textualism. . . . The classical conception of ius
civile . . . can be summed up as positive law without jurisprudential positivism.”).
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Despite the structural similarity with ours of presenting his classically grounded approach as “positive law without jurisprudential positivism,” Vermeule attacks our natural law–based originalism as a “hybrid view[]” that attempts “to combine originalism with an emphasis
on the common good.”73 He says this is “straightforwardly attractive”
when appraised “[a]s a rhetorical posture in what passes for the ‘marketplace of ideas,’” but is, again, “unstable in principle.”74 This is puzzling, because Vermeule also emphasizes the role of positive law in the
nonpositivist classical tradition, without any apparent instability. Yet at
the same time he scorns those who more closely (unstably?) attend to
the promulgated Constitution as positive law in our constitutional system. This confusion is of a piece with the book’s broader lack of clarity
about central concepts in the classical legal tradition and how they fit
together. Only with a better view of this broader picture can one evaluate Vermeule’s argument and the alleged flaws in our approach. Part
II attempts to provide just that before discussing in Part III how that
broader framework plays out in our respective accounts of American
constitutional law and its relationship to constitutional adjudication.
In order to understand how Vermeule’s criticisms of natural law–based
originalism misfire, one must first understand the ways in which his
appropriation and rendition of the classical legal tradition is misfocused.
II.

FOUR-CAUSE CONSTITUTIONALISM VS. VERMEULE’S COMMON
GOOD CONSTITUTIONALISM

Law is “[1] an ordinance of reason [2] for the common good, [3]
made by him who has care of the community, and [4] promulgated.”75
This is the definition of law provided by St. Thomas Aquinas. It provides the structural framework both for our account of natural law–
based originalism and also for Vermeule’s constitutionalism.76 Fidelity
to the understanding of law set forth in this definition is or ought to
be common ground for everyone claiming fidelity to the classical natural law tradition. We therefore use this understanding here as the

73 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 108.
74 Id.
75 2 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-II Q. 90 art. 4 (Fathers of the Eng. Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics Complete Eng. ed. 1981) (c. 1257).
76 See Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 7, at 117–126 (explaining the classical natural
law foundations of positive originalism by reference to law’s four causes of ordinance of
reason, for the common good, made by one with care of the community, and promulgated);
VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 3 (“In the classical tradition, law is seen as—in Aquinas’s famous
definition—an ordinance of reason for the common good, promulgated by a public authority who has charge of the community.”).
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measure of the relative adequacy of our respective accounts of American constitutionalism.
Before addressing each of the four elements of St. Thomas’s definition of law, it helps to put them in their appropriate metaphysical
context. This context is supplied by Aristotle’s four causes, or explanatory principles. As Professor J. Budziszewski explains in his commentary on St. Thomas’s definition of law, “if by a cause of a thing we mean
whatever gives rise to it, whatever explains it, whatever is in any way its
reason why, then there are four different senses in which the term
‘cause’ may be used, and to give a rounded account of anything, we
must identify all four.”77 These four causes are formal cause, final cause,
efficient cause, and material cause.78
Because these terms may not be familiar, we can use the prosaic
example of a sculpted marble statue to show what we mean. The formal
cause is the pattern or organization of the statue, that which first existed in the mind of the sculptor and then took shape in the marble
through the process of sculpting. The final cause is the purpose or
purposes for which the marble statue exists, the end or ends the sculptor sought to accomplish in sculpting the statue. The efficient cause is
the sculptor’s use of tools and techniques to make the sculpture.
(When lawyers think of “causation” they are often thinking in terms of
efficient causes—was the breach of duty a link in the chain of events in
the world leading to the injury?) Finally, the material cause is the marble that makes it up, together with any other material in which the
form of the statue is received and manifested, such as paint or polishing agents. This material cause need not be “matter” in the corporeally extended sense in which that term is typically used now. As Professor Budziszewski clarifies, “for St. Thomas, the term ‘matter’ has a
broader meaning than it does in our own day. Matter is anything that
can receive a form.”79
This clarification is important as we discern each of the four
causes in St. Thomas’s fourfold definition of law. That definition begins with law’s formal cause, “ordinance of reason.” Next is law’s final
cause, the common good. Law’s efficient cause is its making by one
with care of the community, one with lawmaking authority. And law’s
material cause is the matter through which law is promulgated, that
which receives the form of law. This material cause, as with each of the
other three causes, varies depending on the kind of law at issue. For
law made by humans, promulgation is typically accomplished through
77 J. BUDZISZEWSKI, COMMENTARY ON THOMAS AQUINAS’S TREATISE ON LAW 11 (2014).
78 Id. (citing ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS bk. V, pt. 2 (W.D. Ross trans. 1908) (c. 250
B.C.E.)).
79 Id.
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words. “In the strict sense of the term,” Budziszewski explains, “the
essence of law is expressed by its formal cause alone . . . . But St.
Thomas brings in its other three causes . . . because they are essentially
connected with its formal cause.”80 When considering a written human
law made by humans, then, that law is not identical with the words by
which it is promulgated; those words are that law’s material cause only.
That law is more fundamentally the ordinance of reason (its formal
cause) as understood to promote the common good of the polity for
which it is a law (its final cause), by means of that law’s having been
authoritatively made (efficient cause) and promulgated (material
cause). The following figure may be useful in understanding explanation by means of the fourfold Aristotelian classification of causes.
TABLE 1: FOURFOLD ARISTOTELIAN CAUSES
Aristotelian Cause

Marble Statue

Written Human Law

Formal

Sculptor’s Design or
Plan

Lawmaker’s
Ordinance of Reason

Final

Sculptor’s End or
Purpose

Polity’s Common
Good

Efficient

Sculptor’s Acts of
Sculpting

Lawmaker’s
Authoritative Acts

Material

Finished Marble

Law’s Promulgated
Signs

With St. Thomas’s definition of law and Aristotle’s four causes in
mind, an immediate difficulty to confront is how to assess a two-level
approach like Vermeule’s, which distinguishes between generic features of constitutionalism and particular application of the theory to a
given polity. This difficulty arises out of the way in which the two levels
of this approach are detachable by design, as seen in Vermeule’s claim
that his “particular interpretation of our own constitutional order . . .
is separable from the general claims about the nature and principles
of constitutionalism also offered here.”81
Vermeule claims that “[o]ne may subscribe to the general framework of common good constitutional interpretation without subscribing to the full, particular interpretation of the path of American public
80
81

Id. at 12.
VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 12.
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law that I have laid out.”82 This is true as far as it goes, but there is
ample reason for caution. First, at the generic level, the title of Common
Good Constitutionalism should be a warning sign to a classical legal constitutionalist. That law be for the common good is one of law’s four
causes or explanatory principles. One immediately suspects, and it
turns out correctly, that Vermeule’s general theory overemphasizes
one aspect of the classical understanding of law to the neglect of others. This imbalance, which we will discuss below, deforms his particular interpretation of the American constitutional order.
Second, to address Vermeule’s accounts of all four causes of constitutional law, it is necessary to abandon his neat methodological separation of the general and the particular. Discussion of general features only goes so far; as with the sculpture, one quickly needs concrete
examples to make sense of the abstract features.83 That is because law
as an ordinance of reason requires attention to the actual ordaining of
law; law as for the common good requires attention to an actual political community in history; law as made by one with care of the community requires attention to who actually made the law; and law as promulgated requires attention to what its authoritative lawmaker actually
promulgated.
A. Formal Cause: Ordinance of Reason
Law in its central case is neither reason floating freely nor is it a
sheer product of will. Rather it is a willed choice ordained in response
to good reasons.84 The lawmaker’s reason draws on the general principles of the natural law to make reasonable determining choices
about how this community, with this history, at this time, should promote the common good and human flourishing.85 To that end, the
Preamble states that “the People of the United States . . . do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States.”86 By seeking to “form

82 Id.
83 This realization was for us a product of practical insight rather than theoretical
speculation. An earlier version of this Review sought to offer separate critiques of Vermeule’s generic theory of constitutionalism and his particular interpretation of the American order. As a matter of organization and exposition, the need to toggle back and forth
between general idea and particular instantiation was sufficiently important that a sharp
separation struck us as artificial and inconvenient.
84 See, e.g., RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 130 (2012) (stating
that a lawmaker’s act “is a moral choice made in response to reasons”).
85 See id. (“[A legislator] should not aim to identify and give effect to an ideal legal
code, fit for any community: no such code exists.”); id. (“These truths [about moral and
political theory] frame good legislative reasoning but do not exhaust it.”).
86 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility,
provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and
secure the Blessings of Liberty” to themselves and their “Posterity,” the
Constitution’s framers used their reason to advance what they understood as the common good of the polity.87 It is crucial to appreciate,
however, that they concretized the results of their reasoning in written,
positive law. To “ordain,” after all, is to issue an ordinance.
A proper approach to our particular Constitution will repair not
to free-floating reason or background principles or surface meaning
alone, but rather seek to understand the order of reason the Framers
proposed and the ratifiers enacted. To that end, the classical approach
to legal interpretation seeks “to understand the meaning that those
who made the Constitution intended to convey by promulgating the
text in question,” a position we can contrast with the notion of the
Constitution as a “text floating free in the world.”88 Hence, an interpreter like Richard Ekins looks not only to the text, but also to publicly
available evidence about the mischief the legislator was trying to remedy as well as the broader context of statutory structure, related statutes, and background law. Such interpretation could resemble at the
level of method the often-technically elaborate operations of modern
textualism.89 Indeed, as a practical matter Ekins joins textualists in his
epistemic skepticism regarding judicial use of legislative history materials.90 At the level of justification, however, this intention-attentive approach to ascertaining the law made departs from the stated beliefs of
some modern textualists who, like the legal realists and Ronald
Dworkin, reject as confused the idea that a joint actor like a legislature
or framing conventions can have intentions, let alone make reasoned
choices.91 (And, as Jeremy Waldron shows, one does not have to be an
87
88

Id.
Richard Ekins, Objects of Interpretation, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 1 (2017); see also 4
JOHN FINNIS, Introduction to PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: COLLECTED ESSAYS 1, 18 (2011) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHY OF LAW] (explaining that legal rules must be understood not as “statements found in the texts of constitutions, statutes, and judgments or judicial orders, but as
the propositions which are true, as a matter of law, by reason (a) of the authoritative utterance
of those statements taken with (b) the bearing on those utterances and statements (and on
the propositions those utterances were intended to make valid law) of the legal system’s
other, already valid propositions”).
89 See Hillel Y. Levin, Intentionalism Justice Scalia Could Love, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 89
(2015) (book review) (arguing that Ekins’ intentionalism is similar to modern textualists’
at the level of method); Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 349 (2005)
(arguing that an intentionalist may adopt textualist methods because they lead to more
“accurate assessments of legislative intent”).
90 See EKINS, supra note 84, at 268–74 (rejecting use of legislative history).
91 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 313–27 (1986) (offering a skeptical critique
of legislative intention); John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV.
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intentionalist to believe group actors like legislatures are capable of
making particular reasoned choices by enacting canonical, authoritative texts.)92 Classical interpreters of lex, however they may often act in
practice like some modern textualists, search for a reasoned choice
made in the past and embedded in an authoritative formulation.
Vermeule, at times, sings a similar tune. He criticizes approaches
to interpretation that treat enacted texts as a “kind of law without
mind, antithetical to the classical conception of the public authority”
that makes “purposive, reasoned ordinations to promote the common
good.”93 Yet, in operation his approach amounts to a clause-bound,
surface-level textualism that is poorly suited to identifying the reasoned
ordinances the text enacted, but serves as a well-built springboard for
abstract moral readings.
An early clue to this effect comes in his generic discussion of common good constitutionalism. In his glance at the vistas of constitutionalism over time and place, he invokes sundry provisions that, in their
generality, he takes to be embodying and embedding Giovanni Botero’s ragion di stato tradition of “[j]ustice, peace, and abundance, or
recognizable modifications and descendants of these.”94 It is possible
that the British North American Act of 1867, the Preamble and the
General Welfare Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and the limitations
in the European Convention on Human Rights Article 9, section 2 are
all manifestations of this rich, particular tradition.95 The surface meaning, after all, is surely consistent with such a reading. Yet Vermeule’s
generic common good constitutionalism seems profoundly

419, 430 (2005) (arguing that “textualists deny that a legislature has any shared intention
that lies behind but differs from the reasonable import of the words adopted”); Max Radin,
Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930) (arguing that “the intention of the
legislature is undiscoverable in any real sense”).
92 See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 88–146 (1999); cf. Michael Plaxton,
Criminal Law, Morality, and the Rule of Lenity 15 (October 11, 2022) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“But whether we think about legislatures as actors with ‘joint
intentions’ or as Waldronian ‘voting machines,’ the specific text contained in statutory provisions must be treated as reasoned attempts at legislating for the common good.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 16 (discussing how such positive law is “needed to specify or determine what morality requires”).
93 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 105–06 (endnote omitted); see also id. at 80 (describing
epikeia as a “virtue for discerning the reasoned choice that the public authority, as an authority, truly made in and through the text, in light of background principles”).
94 Id. at 31 (citing GIOVANNI BOTERO, THE REASON OF STATE 93 (Robert Bireley ed.,
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2017) (1589)).
95 See British North America Act 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3 (UK); U.S. CONST. pmbl.; id.
art I, § 8, cl. 1; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 9, § 2, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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uninterested in the actual, historical reasoned choices the framers of
these charters made in adopting these texts.
Common Good Constitutionalism’s engagement with our Constitution is no different. Rather than seeking to identify the ordinances of
reason enacted through that document, Vermeule offers a moral reading of what he understands to be our contemporary constitutional order
with respect to rights and the distribution of powers and authority. In
this interpretation of the “small-c” American constitutional order,
which he distinguishes from “the formal written Constitution,” we find
“broad deference to legislatures on social and economic legislation
and broad delegations from legislatures to the executive.”96 As a practical matter, “lawmaking is effectively centered mainly on executive
government, divided in complicated ways between the presidency and
the administrative agencies,” both of which act “according to the rule
of law” to order the polity to the common good.97
Familiar features of the original, written, and enacted Constitution are nowhere to be found. To pick a few, Vermeule’s discussions
of separation of powers are either abstract or limited to the operations
within the administrative state, rather than focusing on the distributed
structure of the original Constitution.98 We learn how the separation
of powers in the Constitutions of Melfi during Aquinas’s time are
roughly analogous to the structure within administrative agencies today,99 but nothing about what legal propositions were made true by
Articles I, II, and III of our actual Constitution. There is no mention
of Article IV, either, but the reader is informed that ideas of state sovereignty are “pernicious.”100 The “so-called sovereignty of the states is
best understood as a constitutional principle of respect and comity”
that the federal authorities should consider “out of prudent respect
for legal justice and small-c constitutional arrangements.”101 Similarly,
federalism in our constitutional order should be submerged in
broader “values of subsidiarity and civil society,” and respected to the
extent such allocation of powers serves those purposes.102 To the extent the positive law of our Constitution precommits our order to a
96 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 10, 11–12.
97 Id. at 12.
98 See id. at 76–77 (discussing Aquinas’s ideas about separation of law-making from
law-interpretation). But see id. at 102 (accusing the current Supreme Court of being exceedingly abstract about separation of powers).
99 See id. at 207 n.201.
100 Id. at 158.
101 Id. But see, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 410 (1819) (“In
America, the powers of sovereignty are divided between the government of the Union, and
those of the States.”).
102 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 159.
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different version of federalism, it must be overcome in the name of
true subsidiarity (for which Vermeule draws on a theory rooted in the
thought of twentieth-century theologian Johannes Messner, among
others).103 “Those who design a written constitution at a given time act
under severe limits of foresight and information and cannot possibly
anticipate all future contingencies.”104 When “rules protecting rigid
spheres of state sovereignty or enacting rigid limits on federal
power . . . inevitably clash with exceptional circumstances whose intrinsic logic requires positive federal action,” it is better to give that federal
power the “flexibility” to treat those rules as “a loose-fitting garment”
to “promote and protect genuine subsidiarity.”105
The same goes for the related point of limits on federal power.
Vermeule recognizes, grudgingly, that the original Constitution was
long understood to deny the federal government a general police
power.106 He claims that this interpretation, which reigned until the
1930s and 1940s, was in tension with McCulloch v. Maryland, and has
nevertheless been happily surpassed by the march of constitutional history.107 In an implicit concession that this departs from the original
law of the Constitution, Vermeule accedes that “all this represents a
development and translation of the original constitutional scheme to
new circumstances,” but it is justified because it preserves the “principles of the common good and general welfare that always underpinned
that scheme, and is therefore valid.”108 The method here is explicit:
departure from (phrased as “development and translation of”) the
original ordinances of reason is valid if the result serves overarching
principles of the common good and general welfare.
Finally, he contends that the original Constitution licenses all this
because “the sweeping generalities and famous ambiguities of our
Constitution afford ample space for substantive moral readings that
promote peace, justice, abundance, health, and safety, by means of just
authority, solidarity, and subsidiarity.”109 He goes on to note, correctly,
that these “highly general and abstract clauses have to be given some
content or other.”110 He chooses to regard them as referring to, and
incorporating “an elaborate tradition specifying the legitimate ends or

103 Id. at 154–58 (citing JOHANNES MESSNER, SOCIAL ETHICS: NATURAL LAW IN THE
WESTERN WORLD (B. Herder Book Co. rev. ed. 1965) (1949)).
104 Id. at 160.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 32–33.
107 Id. at 33–34.
108 Id. at 34.
109 Id. at 38.
110 Id.
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purposes of government in light of the common good,” rather than
attempting to discern whether propositions with more legal content
lurk beneath such beckoning generalities.111 As for the less malleable
particularities of the Constitution, we have seen how overarching principles of the common good and general welfare, bootstrapped in part
from the Constitution’s “sweeping generalities,” allow one to transform ordained rules into prudential reminders of the background values those positive law norms serve.
Our quarrel here is not with the possibility that judges may engage
in first-order reasoning about the natural law in connection with their
administration of justice under positive law, that unwritten legal backdrops inform inferences about the content of constitutional provisions, or that legislators or administrative agencies could take the lead
in realizing a polity’s common good. In the abstract, all of these are
possible and permissible.112 Indeed, some institution needs to make authoritative judgments about the common good, and the natural law
allows a wide range of choices for arrangements for allocating that responsibility. Our complaint here is that the vision of interpretation
Vermeule offers is insufficiently attentive to identifying which arrangement the constituting authorities chose as an ordinance of reason. This
neglect of the particularities of the actual Constitution of the United
States is not merely an implementation problem confined to Vermeule’s particular interpretation of American constitutionalism. It reflects a more basic problem in his understanding about the relationship between (i) law as an ordinance of reason generally and (ii) particular positive laws that accomplish that ordering in any given legal
system.
Overall, Vermeule’s approach to interpretation is best understood
as continuous with his work before he embraced the classical legal tradition. In Common Good Constitutionalism, he presents an argument for
“presumptive textualism,” which he offers as an interpretation of Aquinas to show that a form of textualism is “entirely compatible with the
classical legal tradition.”113 His method for interpreters is:
primarily to ask what the public authority has done by ascertaining
what the authority has said; and secondarily to ask whether the
court faces the nonstandard case in which the authority’s rational
111 Id. at 38–41 (discussing the Preamble, the Commerce Clause, and the Constitution’s invocations of liberty and equality).
112 See, e.g., GRÉGOIRE WEBBER, PAUL YOWELL, RICHARD EKINS, MARIS KÖPCKE, BRADLEY W. MILLER & FRANCISCO J. URBINA, LEGISLATED RIGHTS: SECURING HUMAN RIGHTS
THROUGH LEGISLATION (2018) (offering a natural law argument that legislatures, rather
than courts, should take the lead in protecting human rights).
113 Id. at 75, 80.

2022]

RECOVERING CLASSICAL LEGAL CONSTITUTIONALISM

425

ordering for the common good has been imperfectly captured by
what the authority said, read in light of larger background principles.114

Vermeule therefore offers a two-step approach: interpretation and,
in nonstandard cases, epikeia, or equitable adjustment to bring judgment in a case in line with the lawmaker’s unexpressed intent.
Focusing on the first step here, it is important to note that Vermeule says that “[t]his is the version of textualism I have defended
elsewhere” in Judging Under Uncertainty.115 There, he argued that
courts interpreting positive law “should sharply limit their interpretive
ambitions, in part by limiting themselves to a small set of interpretive
sources and a restricted range of relatively wooden decision-rules.”116
Vermeule, like many textualists, rejected courts’ use of legislative history and normative canons.117 Unlike many textualists, he also contended that courts interpreting a provision should not consult related
statutes or even related provisions of the same statute. 118 Rather,
judges should stick to a provision’s “surface or apparent meaning”
when it appears clear in isolation and defer to political actors when it
is not.119 He grounded this austere approach to interpretation in decision theory: if there is no reason to believe courts are more likely to
improve their accuracy by using additional tools, and if using those
tools is costly for courts and the system, it is better to stay within the
very small confines of apparent meaning.120 The same goes for interpreting constitutions. There, judges should choose the “rule-bound
decision-procedure” in which they “enforce clear and specific constitutional texts[,] . . . eschew ambitious forays beyond this baseline,” and
“defer to legislatures” when provisions are ambiguous.121
The Vermeule of Judging Under Uncertainty did not embrace the
idea that interpretation is something like the search for the reasoned
ordinance of an actual legislator; rather, he claimed that philosophical
arguments about the point of legal interpretation are pointless.122 This
presumptive textualism is a “firmly [rule] consequentialist” exercise in

114
115
116

Id. at 83.
Id. at 207 n.194.
ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 4 (2006).
117 Id. at 189–93 (legislative history); 198–202 (normative canons).
118 Id. at 202–04.
119 Id. at 183.
120 See id. at 192–96 (applying this reasoning to legislative history).
121 Id. at 230.
122 Id. at 2–3.
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decision-theoretic “interpretive choice.”123 Though we assume Vermeule, now a classical natural lawyer, is not a rule-consequentialist all
the way down, his presumptive textualism still bears the mark of the
public-choice inflected method of his earlier adherence to decision
theory. Judges are better off if they “stick to the ordinary meanings of
texts” (also phrased as “apparent meaning[s]”) since judges are
“prone to error.”124 The classical tradition, by contrast, treats the text
as a (very important, but not exclusive) pointer to the legislator’s authoritative, reasoned choice, which in its particularity may be different
or more complex than what we find with some exercises of clausebound textualism.125
The extent to which Vermeule believes he has adhered to or departed from his earlier approach to interpretation is beside the
point.126 Something very much like the surface-level, clause-bound textualism of that earlier work enables his ascent to moral readings in response to apparent ambiguity or vagueness that interpreters find when
they read text in that fashion.127 After all, these “highly general and
abstract clauses have to be given some content or other.”128 In Judging
Under Uncertainty, judges were not to solve such puzzles with the wide123 Id. at 5, 66–67 (emphasis omitted); see Richard Ekins, Interpretive Choice in Statutory
Interpretation, 59 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 6 (2014) (“Vermeule does not elucidate the nature of interpretation but instead aims to establish that the merits of any interpretive theory turn on
‘institutional analysis,’ which concerns the capacities of interpreters and the systemic effects
of alternative interpretive regimes.”).
124 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 74–76; cf. VERMEULE, supra note 116, at 2–3 (arguing
that both intentionalist and intention-skeptics should reject judicial use of legislative history
on the “second-best” ground that “fallible judges are less likely to recapture legislators’
intentions successfully by using such documents”).
125 Compare John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663 (2004) (arguing the Eleventh Amendment’s protections
of state sovereign immunity are limited to its plain text), with Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890) (holding that the text of the Eleventh Amendment points to an original decision
creating a broader limitation on suits against states).
126 His preferred approach is not always entirely clear. He regards “Legal Process Rational purposivism” as an “imperfect echo[]” of the classical tradition due to its “principle
of interpretation that would read statutes not to depart lightly from” well-established background principles. VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 68. Perhaps clearing this up is for “further
work that adumbrates the classical theory of interpretation in modern contexts.” Id. at 80.
In neither mode, however, is he particularly concerned with the historical reasoned choice
that the legislator determined.
127 This textualism-enabled ascent above the ordinances of reason is distinct from the
second step of his method, where epikeia brings an apparently misfiring provision back in
line with the rational ordering of the common good in light of background principles, to
use Vermeule’s formulation. Id. at 77–80. For the most part, Vermeule’s argument seems
to be exploiting surface vagueness or ambiguity.
128 Id. at 38.
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ranging tools that classical lawyers (and modern textualists and purposivists) use, but rather defer to bodies like administrative agencies
or legislatures. Reading between the lines, one sees in Vermeule’s generic account of common good constitutionalism a way forward to a
regime in which centralized agencies are the living oracles of the natural law and the common good. Vermeule draws such a picture in the
particular “Applications” section of his book.129 The surface-hugging,
clause-bound character of presumptive textualism is crucial for realizing that arrangement, however, since a more detailed search to find
the Framers’ reasoned choice may correspondingly limit the remit of
agencies (or, if you prefer, legislators) to give some content ordering
law to the common good. Critics who worry that his book is judicial
supremacy for Catholic integralists miss this point.
The problem is not that Vermeule is wrong here or there about
what the Constitution provides at the level of legal sources. Rather, it
is that Common Good Constitutionalism shows little interest in what original positive law the Constitution reasonably ordained. We can contrast
Vermeule’s approach to interpreting our contemporary constitutional
practices in their best light with our work. There, we drew on the classical tradition’s understanding of positive law’s nature and purpose to
argue that the best way to understand the Constitution was to identify
the original “propositions of law that became valid by virtue of the addition of the Constitution to the rest of the law then in effect.”130 With
other scholars in the classical tradition, we hold that in the central case
the legal interpreter’s object qua interpreter is identifying the propositions—the reasoned ordinances—the lawmaker introduced into the
system of law when it exercised its authority.131
This is not because one should obey positive law for its own sake
or because one is a moral skeptic. Rather it is a recognition that right
practical reason requires reasoned answers to underdetermined questions and that in a large, complex society extending over time,
129 Id. at 136–54.
130 Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 7, at 99.
131 See EKINS, supra note 84, at 246; Ekins, supra note 88, at 1 (applying his approach
to interpretation to the positive law of the constitution); 4 JOHN FINNIS, Reason and Authority
in Law’s Empire, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 88, at 280, 297 (explaining that “a
sound natural law theory would have no hesitation in tracing the legal and thus the moral
authority of most of the law’s rules and institutions” to “rules whose legal and moral authority is directly and simply ascribed to their source, authoritative enactment, or judicial adoption or some other form of ‘convention’”); RUSSELL HITTINGER, THE FIRST GRACE: REDISCOVERING THE NATURAL LAW IN A POST-CHRISTIAN WORLD 72–78 (2003) (explaining how
the classical tradition’s emphasis on the moral importance of positive law has roots running
back to Aquinas’s preference for governance by written law over independent judicial judgment about what the natural law requires in a case).
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unanimity and constant recalibration of such determinations is unreasonable, if not impossible.132 Revisiting reasonable determinations under the guise of interpretation creates afresh the coordination problems legal authority had resolved.133 Thus, it is morally reasonable for
officials to understand interpretation as a search for the reasoned
choices the legislators or framers fixed when promulgating positive law
to advance the common good. This stance, moreover, does not commit one to legal positivism.134 Instead, understanding “the moral need
for law’s positivity is, in many ways, what defines the classical tradition
of legal theory.”135 Vermeule scoffs that arguments like these are “banalities, truisms, universally understood and accepted by all remotely
sensible legal systems—the vast bulk of which would laughingly, or with
some confusion, reject the label ‘originalism.’”136 The problem with
this response, however, is that Vermeule himself refuses to apply such
banal truths to the actual Constitution ordained for our polity.
B. Final Cause: For the Common Good
A different kind of inattention to the relationship between law
and human choice shapes Vermeule’s account of the final cause of
American constitutional law, the political common good. One cannot
understand the common good of any true human community, such as
a family, without understanding how it came to be one. As with families, so too with political communities. Vermeule’s discussion of the
generic political common good is simply too detached from the history
of the United States of America as a distinct political community. This
inattention relates primarily to how the Constitution of the United
132 Cf. Maris Köpcke Tinturé, Positive Law’s Moral Purpose(s): Towards a New Consensus?,
56 AM. J. JURIS. 183, 197 (2011) (book review) (“Because moral requirements are both underdetermined and controversial, it is morally necessary that a law’s validity does not primarily turn on moral considerations.”).
133 As John Finnis has argued, law “tries to isolate . . . ‘legal thought’ . . . from the rest
of practical reasoning” and “‘systematically restricts’ the ‘feedback’ of moral considerations
on legal requirements” for good moral reasons. Maris Köpcke Tinturé, Finnis on Legal and
Moral Obligation, in REASON, MORALITY, AND THE LAW: THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN FINNIS
379, 379 (John Keown & Robert P. George eds., 2013) (quoting JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW
AND NATURAL RIGHTS 312, 318 (Paul Craig ed., 2d ed 2011)).
134 See, e.g., Maris Köpcke Tinturé, Law Does Things Differently, 55 AM. J. JURIS. 201, 216
(2010) (book review) (“We may thus return to the classical tradition’s understanding of law
as uniquely suited to secure a community’s justice by marking certain courses of conduct
and enforcing them so that the law-abiding are not taken advantage of.”).
135 Köpcke Tinturé, supra note 132, at 197.
136 Conor Casey & Adrian Vermeule, Pickwickian Originalism, IUS & IUSTITIUM (Mar.
22, 2022), https://iusetiustitium.com/pickwickian-originalism/ [https://perma.cc/TY7FFDMZ].
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States has advanced the political common good of “We the People of
the United States” in history. The Constitution has done this precisely
as supreme positive law for the people of the United States: “a fixed
and authoritative legal settlement of certain matters contributing to
the common good of a complete political community.”137
The unity of a complete political community defines the scope of
commonness of its political common good. To provide a particular
account of common good constitutionalism for the United States of
America, then, it is necessary to explain how the formation of one political community in the United States came about through a transformation of thirteen colonies into an independent nation. Yet neither
the Declaration of Independence nor the Articles of Confederation
nor the drafting and ratification of the Constitution of the United
States in response to the failures of the Articles to serve the political
common good of one people of the United States shows up in Common
Good Constitutionalism. By contrast, we began Enduring Originalism by
connecting the governmental powers conferred in the Constitution to
the consent of the “one People” who “dissolve[d] the Political Bands”
holding them together with the people of “the State of Great Britain”
in the Declaration of Independence.138 That same “one People” subsequently prevailed in the War for American Independence and experienced the defects of confederated governments under the Articles of
Confederation. This political history explains why “[t]he framers designed the Constitution of the United States to remedy the defects of
government under the Articles.”139 The source of those defects was the
mismatch between the political community of the United States as one
people, and the government of each State with a separate government
legally united in confederation only with the others.140 To properly
serve the political common good of one people, it was fitting to empower one government of, by, and for that people to make and administer supreme law of the land. The Constitution of the United States
accordingly provided for a common national government in addition
to the separate state governments, with the unity of the people of the

137 Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 7, at 126.
138 Id. at 127 (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776)).
139 Id.
140 See id. (“While the people were one at this time, their governments were not. . . .
[E]ach state in this confederacy retained ‘its Sovereignty, freedom, and independence . . .
which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress
assembled.’” (quoting ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. II)).
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United States accounting for the commonness of the political common
good served by the Constitution.141
The continued existence of separate state governments together
with the new government of the United States, gave rise to many theoretical and practical difficulties. The political and legal relationships
between the peoples of the several states and their particular governments, on the one hand, and the people of the United States and the
general government, on the other hand, remained to be worked out
in time. Each state government was responsible for the common good
of the people of each state in the Union as a political community. The
federal government was responsible for the common good of the people of the United States as one political community extending over all
the states. Disputes over the various ways in which the Constitution as
fundamental law would advance the common good of the people of
the United States as a single people with distinct state and federal governments have therefore been with us from the beginning—and, crucially, there was a beginning.
Without an historically grounded account of the unity of the people of the United States with one political common good, Vermeule
cannot offer an account of how the United States government could
arise directly from the people of the United States rather than through
the several states. One can find such an account, however, in Chief
Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court in McCulloch v. Maryland.142
Vermeule quotes McCulloch without much elaboration a few times in
Common Good Constitutionalism, including one occasion in which he
misdescribes it as a Commerce Clause case.143 Vermeule properly
141 As Fr. Aquinas Guilbeau has explained, “the principle distinctive of common goods
properly so called . . . is a unity that diffuses its goodness universally.” Aquinas Guilbeau,
What Makes the Common Good Common? Key Points from Charles De Koninck, 20 NOVA ET VETERA 739, 746 (2022). In this understanding, “universally” is to be understood by reference
to the unity of the unit whose common good we are assessing. That unity on a level capable
of sharing goodness without diminution distinguishes a common good from a collection or
aggregate. See id. (“Unlike a common good, a ‘pure collection’ of particular goods does
not constitute a unity capable of diffusing its goodness wholly and universally to its participants. Instead, as an aggregate of particular goods, a collection diffuses goodness by dividing and dispersing the goods that it collects.”). Consider, for example, the common good
of a family. “[A]s a common good properly so called, the good of the family constitutes a
single good that extends and communicates itself whole and entire to all the members of
the family at once.” Id. at 747. Similarly, as a common good properly so called, the political
common good constitutes a single good capable of extending and communicating itself
whole and entire to all the members of the political community at once.
142 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
143 See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 33 (citing McCulloch and Federal Power Commission v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944), to argue “the scope of federal powers has become
all but equivalent to a general police power in substance”); id. at 34 (asserting that “the
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estimates Marshall as a preeminent jurist in the classical mold. But he
reads Marshall’s masterpiece in McCulloch more with the mind of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., than Joseph Story, whose later scholarly work
synthesized the intellectual legacy of the Marshall Court.144 Vermeule’s
main “takeaway,” so to speak, is that the federal government possesses
a de facto police power.145 Marshall’s fiercest contemporary critics
could not have put their claims about McCulloch any better. As Gerald
Gunther has explained, Marshall took to the newspapers pseudonymously in 1819 to defend against the charge “that McCulloch’s principles endorsed a virtually unlimited central authority, that the Court
had set forth no viable limits on national power.”146 Classical lawyer
that he was, Marshall responded not only at the level of constitutional
principle; he also replied to his critics’ “invocations of common law
and international law and engaged them toe to toe on the true meaning of the learned treatise writers, of Vattel and Grotius and Lord
Coke.”147 Vermeule’s use of McCulloch as support for the acquisition
of a “de facto police power” for the federal government is puzzling. In
doing so, he purports to resolve the question of the extent of the
federal government for all intents and purposes has acquired by prescription, over time, a
de facto police power”); id. at 33(describing the denial of a general police power to the
federal government as “in tension with the McCulloch v. Maryland principle that enumerated powers should be expansively construed over time to accommodate changing circumstances” (endnote omitted)); id. at 40 (commending McCulloch for its “expansive reading
of the Commerce Clause”). McCulloch is not a Commerce Clause case. It is a case about
implied powers and the Necessary & Proper Clause. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 411–
12.
144 On Holmes’s “take” on Marshall, see his response granting the motion to adjourn
court in honor of John Marshall Day on February 4, 1901. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, John
Marshall: In Answer to a Motion that the Court Adjourn, on February 4, 1901, the One Hundredth
Anniversary of the Day on Which Marshall Took His Seat as Chief Justice, in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 266, 270–71 (1920). Holmes described that day’s celebration as standing “for the
rise of a new body of jurisprudence, by which guiding principles are raised above the reach
of statute and State, and judges are entrusted with a solemn and hitherto unheard-of authority and duty. . . . [T]his day marks the fact that all thought is social, is on its way to
action; that, to borrow the expression of a French writer, every idea tends to become first a
catechism and then a code; and that according to its worth his unhelped meditation may
one day mount a throne, and without armies, or even with them, may shoot across the world
the electric despotism of an unresisted power.” Id. at 270–71.
145 See sources cited supra note 143.
146 Gerald Gunther, Introduction to JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 1, 18–19 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969). The charge of consolidated federal power drew
the bulk of Marshall’s response. See id. at 19 (“[T]he thrust of Marshall’s response was to
deny that charge of consolidation, to insist, with more emphasis than in McCulloch itself,
that those principles did not give Congress carte blanche, that they did preserve a true federal system in which the central government was limited in its powers—and that the limits
were capable of judicial enforcement.”).
147 Id. at 18.
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federal government’s powers vis-à-vis the state governments’ powers—
in favor of the federal government once and for all. This contrasts with
McCulloch itself, in which Marshall asserts that the question respecting
“the extent of the powers actually granted, is perpetually arising, and
will probably continue to arise, as long as our system shall exist.”148
Vermeule’s casual mishandling of McCulloch betokens a more general failure to attend systematically to the relationship between lawmaking in service of the political common good, on the one hand, and
the administration of legal justice by courts of law, on the other. Vermeule’s tendency to nod to role morality as a generic matter but neglect it in the particulars of constitutional adjudication is on display in
his account of Justice Harlan’s dissent in Lochner v. New York.149 He
contends that Justice Harlan’s dissent is a “model opinion” for seeing
how the “classical framework operated in the cauldron of judicial practice.”150 We agree, but for different reasons. Vermeule glosses Justice
Harlan’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause jurisprudence
as stemming from a unified framework grounded in the “Constitution’s express commitment to the ‘general welfare’” and the “tacit postulates of the constitutional plan, as to both the federal government
and the states” to advance the common good.151 This characterization
overlooks the extent to which Harlan’s dissent turns on more workaday
engagement with the way in which the Constitution’s positive law,
namely the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, supplied the rule of decision.
Justice Harlan’s understanding of “general welfare” refers to the
state’s police powers (not, as Vermeule asserts, the General Welfare
Clause of the Constitution), the exercise of which is legitimate under
the Due Process Clause as long as it is reasonable in relation to a legitimate end of the state government.152 (On this point, Harlan and the
majority agreed on the applicable doctrinal test but disagreed on its
application.) Finding no violation of this general reasonableness standard incorporated into the Federal Constitution by means of the Fourteenth Amendment, Harlan objected that the majority “transcend[ed]
its functions” by holding unconstitutional the application of New York
statute’s maximum-hours provision to Joseph Lochner.153 Rather than
weighing in on whether the statute in fact advanced the common good,
Justice Harlan found as a federal judge that he could not say the
148
149
150
151
152
153

McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405.
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 61.
Id. at 63.
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 68 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 70.
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legislature acted unreasonably in relation to legitimate ends of government. Given that, “the State is not amenable to the judiciary” for this
statute in this case.154
Harlan grounded this conclusion on his understanding that state
exercises of the police power are permissible under “the Federal Constitution” unless they are “inconsistent with that instrument.”155 That
positive law instrument156 indicates that “the health and safety of the
people of a State are primarily for the State [not the federal judiciary]
to guard and protect.”157 Although the petitioners claimed that the
New York statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment, that argument
could not be sustained “without enlarging the scope of the Amendment far beyond its original purpose.”158 The federal Court had no
warrant to prevent the enforcement and regular operation of state law
except as authorized by the positive law of the Federal Constitution.159
Harlan’s dissent is a model opinion for the classical tradition, but
not as an antioriginalist appeal to a generic common good.160 It treats
the Constitution as a legal instrument that operates as a rule and measure in deciding the matters before it under the Fourteenth Amendment’s federally incorporated restrictions on states. Doing that, of
course, promotes the political common good of the polity that the
Constitution governs. Our particular Constitution recognizes broad
police powers in the states to promote the common good of the people
of the state subject to positively ordained federal-law limitations that
provide an undergirding and overarching orientation to the political
common good of the people of the United States as a whole. This plan
is one (of many possible) reasonable way(s) to make concrete “the
whole teleological conception of the aims of government”161 toward
the political common good of the people of the United States.
154 Id. at 70.
155 Id. at 73.
156 In the language of the law, we note, an “instrument” is a written artifact.
157 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 73 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
158 Id. (emphasis added).
159 Beyond recognizing that the implementing judicial doctrine was filtered through
the Fourteenth Amendment and was appropriately elaborated as federal law only because
of the Fourteenth Amendment, we take no positions on the precise details of the interactions among federal jurisdiction, the doctrine implementing federal review of state law for
conformity to the police power, and general law regarding the nature of the police power.
For a discussion of relevant background, see, for example, Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two
Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97
CALIF. L. REV. 751 (2009).
160 Contra VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 68 (“Harlan’s opinion . . . is not originalism.”).
161 Id. at 63. Cf. RUSSELL HITTINGER, supra note 128, at 133 (“The specific institutional
character of the U.S. Constitution is one among many different kinds of constitutional orders. It differs sharply from those constitutions which display the powers and ends of a
government of general jurisdiction.”).
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Adherence to that plan in adjudication also promotes the political
common good, but primarily by making that positively entrenched
plan a durable reality administrable as a rule and measure of legal justice in courts of law.
C. Efficient Cause: Made by One with Care of the Community
Law is a reasoned ordinance for the political common good. But
whose reasoned ordinance for the common good should one seek to
discover? The classical tradition holds that it is the ordinance of one
with care of the community—lawmaking authority. Vermeule’s common good constitutionalism offers no account of the higher lawmaking authority that, in the context of the United States, is provided by
popular sovereignty. What little Vermeule says about this topic denigrates as irrelevant the lawmaking will historically exercised by “We the
People of the United States.” In particular, Vermeule contends that
“the American constitutional order rests, not upon positive written law,
but upon the ius gentium.”162 Given this belief, it is understandable that
Vermeule neglects the formal, written big-C Constitution in favor of
interpreting the small-c constitutional order. The latter is, in his eyes,
a more fundamental object of focus. As a consequence of neglecting
the ratified Constitution in favor of interpreting the contemporary
constitutional order, nowhere in Common Good Constitutionalism does
Vermeule carefully explain the obligation of obedience to the ratified
Constitution as authoritative law.
He describes “common good constitutionalism” as “classical constitutionalism that, although not enslaved to the original meaning of the
Constitution, also rejects the progressives’ overarching sacramental
narrative, the relentless expansion of individualistic autonomy.”163
The correct next step would be to explain how obedience to the original
law of the Constitution—unless lawfully changed—is distinct from being enslaved to it.164 Obedience, after all, is the proper posture toward
the command of legitimate lawmaking authority.165 But Vermeule
162 Id. at 85.
163 Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
164 Cf., e.g., Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 7, at 99 (“The particular type of constitutional originalism we propose understands the Constitution as enduring original law that
remains fixed and authoritative until lawfully changed.”); 3 AQUINAS, supra note 75, at II-II
Q. 57 art. 4 (developing Aristotelian distinctions distinguishing paternal right and dominative right from civic or political right); id. Q. 58 art. 7 (distinguishing domestic justice, involving relations of husband and wife, father and son, and master and slave, from “justice
simply”).
165 See 3 AQUINAS, supra note 75, at II-II Q. 104 art. 2 (“[T]he proper object of obedience is a precept, and this proceeds from another’s will. Wherefore obedience makes a
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provides no account of legal justice with the legal Constitution as its
rule and measure by virtue of its authority, nor of obedience to the
legal Constitution as the appropriate response of those subject to its
requirements. Indeed, the authority of those who, with care of the
community, made the Constitution as law is nowhere to be found. Rather, one moves from the ius gentium to the practices of a small-c constitutional order without asking whether or how those practices square
with the intervening choices of the Constitution’s lawmaking authority.
Consider Vermeule’s proposal that common good constitutional
interpretation “should take as its starting point substantive moral principles that conduce to the common good, principles that officials (including, but by no means limited to, judges) should read into the majestic generalities and ambiguities of the written Constitution.”166 This
proposed approach differs from ours in its starting point and in its resulting interpretive attitude. The Vermeulean common good constitutionalist starts constitutional interpretation with “substantive moral
principles that conduce to the common good”; the classically
grounded originalist starts the same activity with the Constitution as
enacted law. The Vermeulean common good constitutionalist reads
these substantive moral principles into the Constitution’s words; the
classically grounded originalist discerns the legal propositions

man’s will prompt in fulfilling the will of another, the maker, namely, of the precept.”); id.
art. 3 (“All acts of virtue, in so far as they come under a precept, belong to obedience.
Wherefore according as acts of virtue act causally or dispositively towards their generation
and preservation, obedience is said to ingraft and protect all virtues.”). The requirement
of obedience to the will of a lawmaking superior as set forth in a precept is, of course, subject
to limits. See, e.g., id. art. 5 (identifying “two reasons, for which a subject may not be bound
to obey his superior in all things,” namely “on account of the command of a higher power,”
and “if the [superior] command[s a person] to do something wherein he is not subject to
him”); id. art. 6 (“Man is bound to obey secular princes in so far as this is required by the
order of justice. Wherefore if the prince’s authority is not just but usurped, or if he commands what is unjust, his subjects are not bound to obey him, except perhaps accidentally,
in order to avoid scandal or danger.”). The key point here is that subsequent interpreters
of the Constitution are required to be obedient to precepts proceeding from the superior
authority that promulgated the Constitution.
166 The formulation quoted in text is from Vermeule’s earlier exposition in Adrian
Vermeule, Beyond Originalism, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com
/ideas/archive/2020/03/common-good-constitutionalism/609037/
[https://perma.cc
/4XA8-XJJP]. The corresponding formulation in Common Good Constitutionalism has minor
differences in wording and structure but appears to be intended as substantively indistinguishable. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 38 (“The sweeping generalities and famous ambiguities of our Constitution afford ample space for substantive moral readings that promote peace, justice, abundance, health, and safety, by means of just authority, solidarity,
and subsidiarity.”).
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determined by means of the promulgated Constitution and other principles of legal right.
An illuminating exposition of the limits of Vermeule’s approach
in this regard comes from the response that Vermeule and coauthor
Professor Conor Casey provided to Professor Joel Alicea’s article, The
Moral Authority of Original Meaning.167 In this article, Alicea offers “a
natural law justification for originalism grounded in the legitimate authority of the people-as-sovereign, authority that is necessary for achieving the common good.”168 Alicea observes that Vermeule “acknowledges the importance of legitimate authority, but he provides no account of who the legitimate authority that promulgated the Constitution was or what implications that has for constitutional adjudication.”169 Alicea’s observation is accurate. And devastating.
Casey and Vermeule dodge the issues of authority and obedience
in their response. They summarize Alicea’s argument as establishing
two propositions:
[F]irst, all officials are compelled to faithfully adhere to and interpret the meaning of X, Y or Z provisions posited and fixed by a
legitimate political authority at a given historical point in time . . .
unless and until those provisions are lawfully repealed or replaced;
and second, interpreters of the law (such as judges) ought not to
displace the posited law by reference to all-things-considered moral
decision making.170

Casey and Vermeule accept these propositions as “banalities, truisms, universally understood and accepted by all remotely sensible legal systems.”171 This thin-gruel, lowest-common-denominator, generic
originalism, they say, avoids “the immensely more difficult question of
how to interpret the posited law—how precisely one ought to faithfully
respect the meaning of this or that historically posited and fixed provision.”172 This is where Casey and Vermeule stumble. They rely on
Professor Cass Sunstein’s claim that “there is nothing that interpretation ‘just is.’”173 But that sort of objection misses the mark when directed at a classical account of interpreting valid enacted law.
167 J. Joel Alicea, The Moral Authority of Original Meaning, 98 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1
(2022).
168 Id. at 5.
169 Id. at 7 (footnote omitted).
170 Casey & Vermeule, supra note 136.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Cass R. Sunstein, There Is Nothing That Interpretation Just Is, 30 CONST. COMMENT.
193, 193 (2015). Casey and Vermeule adapt this phrase to say, “there is nothing that
originalism just is.” Casey & Vermeule, supra note 136. Sunstein’s principal claim is that
“[a]ny approach [to constitutional interpretation] must be defended on normative
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One reading of their argument is that what it means to “interpret”
positive law is sufficiently contested such that originalist approaches do
not have a claim on the term without normative argument. The classical tradition, however, takes a such normative stance when it comes to
interpreting authoritative legal acts (as opposed to poems, dreams, or
other texts). That tradition emphasizes the need for authority to bind
actors going forward through the expression of lawmaking acts.
Therefore, in the central case of interpreting a legal instrument, the
legal interpreter’s object as legal interpreter should be identifying the
propositions the lawmaker introduced into the system of law when it
exercised its authority.174 One must go back to the origins.
But how? The classical tradition’s emphasis on authority guides
us on this question of interpretive choice. Legal authorities use texts
“to convey their intended meaning-content.”175 If one is seeking to
identify that authoritative content, it reasonable to presume176 that the
originally intended legal impact of that enacted text is whatever propositions correspond to the communicative content of the text as ascertained by a reasonable member of the public at the time (or that content as modified by then-prevailing norms about textual interpretation).177 If one abandons original meaning in favor of moral readings,
“one is not understanding [the enactment] as an act of language use
but rather simply deeming it a canvas on which one projects the meanings one wishes had been intended.”178 Understanding interpretation
as the search for original meaning, therefore, best treats the Constitution as “a deliberate lawmaking act the intended of meaning of which
is to be upheld.”179 Or, in other words, as authoritative.180
Locating a constitutional interpreter’s activity within the broader
category of obedience to the past acts of a lawmaking superior does

grounds—not asserted as part of what interpretation requires by its nature.” Sunstein, supra, at 193. An account of interpretation rooted in the classical tradition offers such normative grounds.
174 EKINS, supra note 84, at 246. See generally supra Section II.A.
175 Ekins, supra note 88, at 22.
176 Id. at 10 (“In conveying some meaning to a large and distant audience, speakers
and authors have good reason to attempt to speak clearly and directly.”).
177 Id. at 22 (“The continuity of law and the importance of self-government over time
both provide very powerful reasons to consider the original meaning of the Constitution
decisive.”).
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Casey and Vermeule also suggest that the variety of originalist theories is fatal for
this more general defense of originalism. See Casey & Vermeule, supra note 136. As our
preceding paragraph suggests, deliberation about how best to account for authority (or any
other of the three Thomistic causes) can guide the classical lawyer through these thickets.
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not necessarily solve the sometimes-difficult problems of identifying
those propositions of law that are to be obeyed. But the charge that a
would-be interpreter is “reading in”—rather than reading off or reading out—is a criticism with real bite. It is to accuse the interpreter of
operating with an attitude of insufficient obedience. The appropriate
response of one who holds himself out as a faithful interpreter but is
accused of insufficient obedience is to deny the charge, not to embrace
the illegitimate activity. That is the right response, in any event, for a
classical natural lawyer who respects the moral point of this kind of
legal interpretation of this kind of legal instrument.
Vermeule at times appears sensitive to this objection. Consider
his coauthored essay, Myths of Common Good Constitutionalism. There,
he and Casey describe as a “myth[]” the claim that “[l]egal and constitutional interpretation in the classical tradition substitutes morality
for law and reduces legal questions to all-things-considered moral decision-making from first principles.”181 Another “myth[]” is that
“[t]he classical tradition ignores the text and has no respect for posited
law.”182 These are both myths, say Casey and Vermeule, “about the
classical legal tradition and its emphasis on the common good.”183 We
agree. But as Vermeule acknowledges, his own account of how the
classical legal tradition is instantiated within the constitutional order
of the United States is separable from the generic version of common
good constitutionalism defended in Myths. The salutary disclaimers
and clarifications defending the generic theory in Myths are missing in
action in Common Good Constitutionalism’s application of the theory to
the United States and its formal written Constitution as an authoritatively promulgated law. Without any account of the higher lawmaking
authority that makes the Constitution fundamental positive law, Vermeule is unable to explain the interpreter’s obligation of obedience to
the promulgated Constitution.184

181 Casey & Vermuele, Essay, Myths of Common Good Constitutionalism, 45 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 103, 103–04 (2022).
182 Id. at 104.
183 Id. at 103.
184 Similar flaws plague Vermeule’s disclaimer that common good constitutional theory in general includes “principles of role morality that allocate lawmaking authority among
institutions.” VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 38. This invocation of “role morality” is nested
in his discussion of how to make moral readings of the “sweeping generalities” of the Constitution. Id. His discussion shows little interest in exploring the extent to which the positive
law of the Constitution specifies who has authority to make law in pursuit of those principles
of the common good and how.
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D. Material Cause: Promulgated
Promulgation—the act that announces a legal norm in a particular form—is critical for law’s task. If citizens and officials cannot identify the authority’s determinations, those choices will be inert and fail
to serve their purpose. For this reason, practically wise legislators will
fix their chosen norms in durable forms. This does not mean all law
has to be codified, though the classical tradition prefers fixing law in
canonical, systemic text.185 Nor should we identify the law with the
words with which it is promulgated; those words are that law’s material
cause, signs by which the law as an ordinance of reason for the common good is authoritatively promulgated. Nevertheless, the promulgated instrument fixes for posterity, and points its readers toward,
those reasoned, authoritative choices for the common good.
As with authority and obedience, Vermeule has very little to say
about promulgation. We see a passing note that “the nature of institutions and the allocation of a lawmaking authority . . . are left for specification that gives concrete content to the operative, small-c constitution (which is not necessarily the same as the formal written Constitution even in polities that have the latter).”186 The generic character of
“specification” does not clarify how authority will embed those choices,
but the proviso suggests that any such choices operate independent of
the (or any) promulgated, large-C Constitution. When he later emphasizes that courts generally should defer to promulgated, specifying
decisions by legislatures and executive actors, he emphasizes that this
is a function of “the political morality of the common good” and “the
best interpretation of our constitutional practices.”187 Promulgation of
ordinary law, while important to his theory, appears to be the task of
authorities acting under the color of an unpromulgated (small-c) constitutional order.
Thus, while Vermeule may be attentive to the classical tradition’s
preference for promulgation at the level of ordinary law, he appears to
abjure it at the level of constitutional law. This is odd, especially as a
prelude to an argument about American constitutionalism, which gives
a central role to promulgation of a fixed, durable, written instrument.
In fact, this aspect of the book’s general framework seems custom-

185 Cf. EKINS, supra note 84, at 125 (“Public promulgation and canonical formulation
[in legislation] make the legal change easier to locate and grasp than that found in unwritten custom or in the best understanding of a line of cases.”); HITTINGER, supra note 131, at
72–78 (discussing St. Thomas’s prudential assessment of the relative superiority of “administering justice on the basis of written laws” rather than “on the basis of the virtuous discernment of a wise judge”).
186 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 10.
187 Id. at 43.

440

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 98:1

made to elide this feature of our current constitutional order, allowing
the theorist to interpret our “small-c” practices without the constraint
of entrenched “large-C” propositions. In this respect, Vermeule’s generic level of common good constitutional theorizing is not in fact
“separable” from his particular account of the American constitutional
order. Like a filter designed to block certain wavelengths on the spectrum, Vermeule’s generic approach to constitutionalism renders the
particular promulgations of the ratified Constitution invisible from the
start, or at least drains them of their color.
A more robust rendition of the classical framework at the generic
level builds in attention to the actual history of the particular constitutional order. And our order, emphatically, is one which, in line with
the classical tradition, emphasizes promulgated constitutional law.
The instrument the Framers chose for securing the people’s rights and
conferring the government’s powers was a written Constitution that
was to be legally authoritative for future generations by remaining
fixed in writing until annulled or changed in the manner it prescribed.188 Indeed, a central point of contention in ratification debates
was whether the written, promulgated Constitution would constrain
enough. Brutus feared, and Hamilton sought to rebut, the possibility
that equitable interpretation by courts and Congress would expand the
government’s powers beyond the limits of the promulgated Constitution.189
After ratification, the same beat went on. Chief Justice Marshall
in Marbury v. Madison linked the Constitution’s written promulgation
to its capacity to bind in the future and understood it as a “superior,
paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means.”190 The same holds for
early commentators of various stripes, such as St. George Tucker,
Thomas Sergeant, William Rawle, Chancellor James Kent, and, most
prominently Justice Joseph Story.191 His 1833 treatise, which consolidated the legacy of the Marshall Court, rejected arguments, based in

188 See Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 7, at 127–28.
189 See id. at 129–30 (first citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 406 (Alexander Hamilton)
(George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001); and then citing Brutus, ESSAY XI (Jan.
31, 1788), reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL ANTIFEDERALIST 185, 187 (W.B. Allen & Gordon Lloyd
eds., 2d ed. 2002)).
190 See id. at 130–31 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
Marshall himself took the newspapers to dispel the notion that his decision in McCulloch v.
Maryland was inconsistent with the notion of a fixed constitution. See John Marshall, A
Friend of the Constitution, Letter IX (July 14, 1819), reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF
MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND, supra note 146, at 207, 209.
191 See Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 7, at 133–34 (discussing Tucker, Sergeant,
Rawle, Kent, and Story).
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“policy” and “convenience,” against a fixed constitution.192 Such fluctuations were unsuitable to the kind of law that the Constitution is,
which is “to have a fixed, uniform, permanent construction” and not
be “dependent upon the passions or parties of particular times, but the
same yesterday, to-day, and forever.”193
In sum, any generic theory of constitutionalism in the classical tradition must attend to the particularities of constitutional promulgation
in a given order. Failure to do so not only neglects a crucial cause of
legal ordering, but renders it incapable of offering a complete account
of an order like ours, which emphasizes promulgation of a written Constitution as a legal instrument establishing authoritative, reasoned
choices for the common good. Vermeule’s general approach to constitutional theorizing falters on this factor, with predictable results when
he turns to our particular order.
For example, Vermeule’s canonical case on the relationship between constituent authority and the Constitution is United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.194 He relies on the opinion for its “methodological” implications, holding it up as a model of how “the welltrained reason of the informed lawyer” should apply “general principles of constitutionalism accessible to the reason.”195 He describes Justice Sutherland’s opinion for the Court in this case as an “example of
the lost classical tradition in American law, erased by originalism’s rewriting of our history, and desperately in need of recovery.”196 Vermeule exalts the opinion for its account of the “powers of external

192 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 426, at 326 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 5th ed. 1994) (1891).
193 Id.
194 299 U.S. 304 (1936). In that case, the Supreme Court reversed a trial court’s dismissal on demurrer of criminal charges brought against three corporations and four corporate officers. This reversal meant these defendants had to answer for their violation of a
federal prohibition of certain arms sales in connection with an ongoing international conflict. Id. at 314, 333. The prohibition they violated arose from a power to prohibit arms
sales that Congress had effectually delegated to the President to activate, and that the President had activated by proclamation. Id. at 311–14. The Supreme Court held that the trial
court erred in determining that this executive activation of delegated authority involved an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Id. at 329. The trial court’s decision rested
on the Schechter Poultry case in which the Supreme Court held government action unconstitutional on nondelegation grounds the prior Term. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp.
Corp., 14 F. Supp. 230, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1936) (citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)). Justice Sutherland’s opinion for the Court in Curtiss-Wright
set aside that and all other precedents involving domestic matters by distinguishing between
internal affairs (at issue in Schechter Poultry) and external affairs (at issue in this case). This
move set the stage for the discussion of principle that Vermeule finds so decisive.
195 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 88–89.
196 Id. at 89.
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sovereignty” flowing from the British Crown “not to the [American]
colonies severally, but to the colonies in their collective and corporate
capacity as the United States of America.”197 Vermeule describes as
“shockingly anti-originalist” Justice Sutherland’s statement that “[t]he
Union existed before the Constitution.”198 This idea that the Union
preexisted the Constitution, Vermeule says, “may be one of the most
consequential sentences ever to appear in the United States Reports—
at least for those who overlook the difference between our small-c constitutional order and the written text of the Constitution and its original understanding.”199 This case study purportedly illustrates how “the
American constitutional order rests, not upon positive written law, but
upon the ius gentium.”200
Vermeule’s description of what he is up to with Curtiss-Wright
should alert the well-formed reader to a false dilemma. (As should his
focus on a case that even nonoriginalists view as a poorly reasoned outlier.)201 Within the classical natural law tradition, the positive written
law and the ius gentium contribute in different ways to a particular constitutional order. The municipal constitutional law of a particular polity and the ius gentium have a common source in the natural law. But
their specifications are not necessarily of equal weight and authority
within a given constitutional order. For purposes of decisions in federal courts of the United States, the way that the ius gentium interacts
with the positive law of the United States is a function of the Constitution of the United States, not the ius gentium directly.
In deploying Curtiss-Wright as authority for denying that the American constitutional order rests upon a promulgated legal instrument,
Vermeule does not forsake an origin story for the American constitutional order, but rather replaces the actual origins with a substitute.
This substitution enables Vermeule to bypass the inconvenient facts of
the formal written Constitution and its relationship to the lawmaking
authority, which in the American context is rooted in popular sovereignty. As with most fables, there is an element of truth to Vermeule’s
incomplete origin story. The ius gentium at the time of ratification
197 Id. at 86 (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 316).
198 Id. at 87 (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 317) (alteration in original).
199 Id.
200 Id. at 85.
201 See H. Jefferson Powell, The Story of Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 195, 231 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009)
(describing Justice Sutherland’s opinion as “obsolete or unimportant” and arguing that it
is “truly bizarre to think that profound questions about the foreign policy of the United
States might turn on Sutherland’s words: no one embraces Sutherland’s cherished theory
about the twofold nature of federal power and the opinion probably doesn’t make sense
without the theory”).
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informs what Stephen Sachs has described as constitutional backdrops;
it remains a source of law to be considered with other sources today.202
It is not, however, supreme law of the land under the Supremacy
Clause.203 Nor is there anything “shockingly anti-originalist” about the
idea that “the Union existed before the Constitution.” The Supremacy
Clause itself speaks directly to treaties made pursuant to the authority
of the United States before the Constitution.204 Even more straightforward textual evidence for the Union’s existence before the Constitution is, of course, in the Preamble (as Justice Sutherland himself
notes). The first professed object of “We the People of the United
States” is “to form a more perfect Union.”205 The preexisting Union
was to be made more perfect, made more through-and-through a Union. Direct evidence for the true legal relationship between the written
Constitution and the small-c constitutional order is right there in the
text. Once one identifies the promulgated Constitution as the product
of the highest lawmaking authority for the Union, it is a mistake to
appeal over its head to the ius gentium for the purposes of identifying
the supreme federal law. There is no higher federal law than the Constitution according to the authoritatively promulgated positive law in
the Supremacy Clause and the lawmaking intentions expressed in the
Preamble.
As a competing canonical case on constituent authority and promulgation we offer Barron v. Baltimore.206 Chief Justice John Marshall’s
opinion for the Court in Barron provides a superior example of how a
well-trained classical lawyer should understand the promulgated nature of the legal Constitution, including its rights language. There, the
Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review a state court’s denial of
the claim that Baltimore took an individual’s property for public use
202 See Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1818
(2012) (defending “the existence, utility, and legitimacy of constitutional backdrops,” understood as preexisting legal rules that enjoy continuing legal force under the Constitution); cf. id. at 1884 (“If the Union enjoyed a foreign affairs power before the Constitution
or the Articles of Confederation, and if that power descended specifically to the executive
branch, and if that power is outside the scope of textual provisions (such as the Tenth
Amendment) that might limit it, and if that power is immune from ordinary means of
change, then the reasoning in Curtiss-Wright might be correct.” (footnote omitted)).
203 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
204 The Supremacy Clause states: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” Id. The
distinction between treaties already made and those yet to be made speaks directly to preand post-ratification treaties. The Constitution distinctly identifies the two categories and
explicitly affirms both as “the supreme Law of the Land.”
205 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
206 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.207 The decision turned on lack of appellate jurisdiction,
which depended, in turn, on the absence of a federal-law determination by the state court that was reviewable by the Supreme Court of the
United States.208 Barron contended that Baltimore had rendered his
property valueless.209 Marshall reasoned that Barron had no recourse
for his injury under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause because
that protected only against actions of the federal government.210
Marshall described the Constitution of the United States as an “instrument” that had been “ordained and established by the people of
the United States for themselves, for their own government, and not
for the government of the individual states.”211 He contrasted the Constitution of the United States with the various state constitutions; those
were instruments establishing “distinct governments, framed by different persons and for different purposes.”212 Marshall acknowledged
that the Federal Constitution imposed some restrictions on the state
governments. But these restrictions—in Article I, Section 10—“are
brought together in the same section, and are by express words applied
to the states.”213 By contrast with the express words of Article I, Section
10, the prohibition imposed by the Takings Clause was framed in general terms through use of the passive voice. It was contained in the first
set of amendments to the Constitution, which were “universally understood . . . [as] a part of the history of the day, . . . [to provide] security
207 Id. at 247–51.
208 Id. at 250–51.
209 Id. at 243–44.
210 Id. at 247–51.
211 Id. at 247. Reasoning that “[t]he people of the United States framed such a government for the United States as they supposed best adapted to their situation, and best
calculated to promote their interests,” Marshall asserted that “[t]he powers they conferred
on this government were to be exercised by itself, and the limitations on power, if expressed
in general terms, are naturally, and, we think, necessarily applicable to the government
created by the instrument.” Id.
212 Id. In those state constitutions, Marshall contended, the people of each state “have
imposed such restrictions on their respective governments as their own wisdom suggested,
such as they deemed most proper for themselves.” Id. at 247–48. The content of the restrictions imposed by the people of each state on the government of each state “is a subject
on which they judge exclusively, and with which others interfere no farther than they are
supposed to have a common interest.” Id. at 248.
213 Id. This design and wording supported a straightforward structural inference that
“in a constitution framed by the people of the United States for the government of all, no
limitation of the action of government on the people would apply to the state government,
unless expressed in terms.” Id. at 248–49. The “application to states” of the restrictions in
Article I, Section 10 was “not left to construction,” but was “averred in positive words.” Id.
at 249. These positive words specifying the entities prohibited from acting in Article I, Section 10, were “No State shall.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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against the apprehended encroachments of the general government—
not against those of the local governments.”214 Because “[t]hese
amendments contain no expression indicating an intention to apply
them to the state governments,” Marshall reasoned, “[t]his court cannot so apply them.”215
There is no question that the kind of injury alleged by Barron
could have counted as a legal injury actionable under some other body
of law, like state law or the general law.216 But because of the jurisdictional allocations then in effect, the dispositive issue in Barron v. Baltimore was whether Barron’s injury was cognizable as a matter of federal
law. The Constitution created a new government and gave rise to a
corresponding new body of positive law—the law of the United States.
One cannot identify the content of this new positive law by reasoning
immediately from first principles.217 While it would be a mistake to
identify the positive law of the Constitution with the words of the Constitution alone, it is also a mistake to untether the law of the Constitution from the history of the Constitution. The history of that law has a
beginning—an origin.
This historical origin of constitutional law in the promulgated
Constitution is why Vermeule is wrong that “all attempts to combine
originalism with the classical view of law are ultimately incoherent, an
attempt to mix oil and water.”218 Vermeule argues that “precisely to
the extent that American lawyers are genuinely originalist, they should
have the courage to discard originalism altogether in favor of the classical law, the fundamental matrix for the thinking of the whole founding generation.”219 But this is precisely backwards. “The fundamental
matrix for the thinking of the whole founding generation” is why classical lawyers should be original-law originalists today. The basic claim
of original-law originalism rooted in the classical legal tradition is that
the original law of the Constitution contributes to the content of our
constitutional law today insofar as it has been carried forward from its
origin in the promulgated Constitution.

214 Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 250.
215 Id.
216 Barron had won a damages verdict of $4,500, but a Maryland appellate court reversed. Id. at 246.
217 Our description of Barron is designed to leave open the possibility that the best
understanding of the case is that it did not resolve the still-ongoing “debate about the declaratory nature of enumerated rights.” Jud Campbell, Constitutional Rights Before Realism,
2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 1433, 1435.
218 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 2.
219 Id.
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The foundational contribution of the original law of the Constitution then to our constitutional law now is the key insight of Professor
Stephen Sachs in Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change.220 As Sachs
explains:
Originalism is . . . a theory of our law: a particular way to understand where our law comes from, what it requires, and how it
can be changed.
This view starts with a common assumption of legal systems,
that the law stays the same until it’s lawfully changed. . . .
To an originalist, . . .[w]hatever rules of law we had at the
Founding, we still have today, unless something legally relevant
happened to change them. Our law happens to consist of their law,
the Founders’ law, including lawful changes made along the way.
Preserving the meaning of the Founders’ words is important, but
it’s not an end in itself. It’s just a means to preserving the content
of the Founders’ law.221

Sachs in that article, and Professor William Baude in another from
around the same time, presented a version of original-law originalism
grounded in legal positivism.222 We wrote Enduring Originalism shortly
thereafter because we agreed with their approach of grounding constitutional law in an understanding of the Constitution as positive law,
but we disagreed with their Hartian legal positivism at the level of jurisprudential foundations. What Vermeule waves off years later as a
clever “rhetorical posture in what passes for the ‘marketplace of
ideas,’”223 was in fact a project of recovery and rehabilitation.
The argument in Enduring Originalism draws on the classical tradition’s understanding of positive law’s nature and value to argue that
the best way to understand the Constitution is to identify the “propositions of law that became valid by virtue of the addition of the Constitution to the rest of the law then in effect.”224 An interpreter seeks to
understand the original law the Constitution created not because a
positivist rule of recognition happens to say so and not because lawyering should be a morally neutral enterprise. Rather, one does so because of the classical natural law tradition’s teaching on the crucial role
that the positive law of the promulgated Constitution plays in securing
the common good of the people of the United States.
220 Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
817 (2015).
221 Id. at 818–19.
222 See William Baude, Essay, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015).
223 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 108; see also id. at 116 (writing off our proposal as a
“political and rhetorical” gambit).
224 Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 7, at 99.
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Vermeule relies on the scholarship of legal historian Professor
Jonathan Gienapp asserting that “[o]riginalists’ understanding of constitutional writtenness . . . is anachronistic, a species of modern constitutional thinking that they unwittingly and uncritically impose on the
eighteenth century.”225 Whatever force this charge may have as
pressed against others, though, the indictment does not cover our understanding of the promulgated words of the written Constitution as
the material cause of the law of the Constitution.226 Four-cause legal
constitutionalism is the classical understanding, not “a species of modern constitutional thinking that [we or Vermeule] unwittingly and uncritically impose on the eighteenth century.”227 Because of the
225 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 186 n.4 (quoting Jonathan Gienapp, Written Constitutionalism, Past and Present, 39 L. & HIST. REV. 321, 324 (2021)) (omission in original).
226 To be sure, there are aspects of Enduring Originalism that we would have described
differently if we had written with the benefit of Professor Gienapp’s scholarship on the development of the concept of constitutional fixity through the 1790s in his later-published
book, JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
IN THE FOUNDING ERA (2018). For example, Gienapp shows how it is far from a “simple
claim” that “the Constitution was designed to be fixed and authoritative fundamental law.”
Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 7, at 126. The relationship between our classically
grounded original-law originalism and Gienapp’s rich historical account deserves more detailed consideration than we provide here. In particular, our treatment of Marshallian constitutionalism as canonical requires an explanation that addresses Gienapp’s claims regarding other could-have-been contenders for canonicity, such as (James) Wilsonian constitutionalism. See, e.g., GIENAPP, supra, at 99–101. We note, nevertheless, that the “Second
Creation” that Gienapp heralds in his book’s title is the emergence of operative consensus
around an idea of constitutional fixity through postratification debates in the 1790s. See
GIENAPP, supra, at 7–12. This development provides further support for the centrality to
constitutional practice of the relationship between writtenness and fixity described in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176–77 (1803). It also explains the common contrast
from the late 1790s onwards between the customary unwritten British constitution and
America’s written Constitution. See Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 7, at 126 & n.153. Despite convergence on a shared conception of constitutional fixity, various constitutional debates continued to turn on competing conceptions of the nature of the union and the relationship of the Constitution. See, e.g., Kevin C. Walsh, Statutory Jurisdiction and Constitutional Orthodoxy in McCulloch, Cohens, and Osborn, 19 GEO. J.L. & PUB POL’Y 73, 107–10
(2021) (summarizing ways in which debates over the Supreme Court’s statutory jurisdiction
and the extent of federal legislative power were intertwined with conceptions of the nature
of the Union). Although we reject social contract theory, we agree with Gienapp that
“[w]hat the Constitution said was a function of the kind of a people and union it spoke
for.” Gienapp, supra note 216, at 355; see also Part II.B, supra. A challenge for us, for Vermeule, and for any others who aim to understand the Constitution within a classical legal
framework while accounting for the pervasive influence of social-contract theory is to explain how the endurance of the classical legal framework over time underwrites the endurance of the Constitution as law over time.
227 See also Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 7, at 126 (“Our recourse to the classical
natural law framework does not impose a theoretical import on our law, but reintroduces
our predecessors’ framework for positive law to their posterity.”); VERMEULE, supra note 1,
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foundational role of the promulgated Constitution, it remains our view
that original-law originalism jurisprudentially grounded in the classical
legal tradition is still the best way in which “the core theoretical insights and jurisprudential principles of the classical legal tradition can
be recovered, adapted, and translated into our world, so as to yield a
better interpretation of the past and present of our operative constitutional order.”228
III.

PROMULGATED AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: VERMEULE’S
CRITICISMS REVISITED

The critique above builds on and extends our prior work in Enduring Originalism, which sought to show how the best version of constitutional originalism fits in with the classical legal tradition’s understanding of law. Vermeule gave our work sustained attention and criticism in Common Good Constitutionalism.229 Now that we have restated
our approach to understanding the law of the Constitution and offered
our criticisms of Vermeule’s rendition, we can contextualize and address his objections to ours.
Vermeule characterizes our approach as a kind of “hybrid view[]”
that attempts “to combine originalism with an emphasis on the common good.”230 For reasons we discuss below, we reject this characterization. Yet, for ease of organization, we will group Vermeule’s objections and our responses under two headings that track his hybrid construct: (i) arguments about our approach’s fidelity to the classical understanding of law, and (ii) criticisms about originalism in operation.
A. Contesting the Place of Originalism in the Classical Tradition
Vermeule writes that “[w]hile . . . the classical law includes positive
law in the sense of the ius civile, and indeed puts positive law into a
at 18 (“Properly speaking, the classical approach to law is not an opponent or alternative to
originalism or textualism. Rather, it includes its own properly chastened versions of those
ideas, because it includes the ius civile as part of a larger scheme of law, and because it
respects the authority that determines the content of the positive law.”).
228 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 3 (endnote omitted).
229 Id. at 109–15 (citing Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 7). Although we are honored
by the critical notice, an even better foil would have been Professor Lee Strang, whose book,
Originalism’s Promise, brings together several strands of argument worked out in several law
review articles over several years and offers a far more fleshed out argument than our jointly
authored article and one of our solely authored essays. LEE J. STRANG, ORIGINALISM’S PROMISE: A NATURAL LAW ACCOUNT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 267 (2019). As it is, Strang
receives a perfunctory, general citation as an example of this rival “hybrid” approach. See
VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 213 n.290 (citing STRANG, supra).
230 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 108.
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right relationship with law generally, originalist positivism is a different
approach altogether.”231 According to Vermeule, the natural law–
based approach we presented in Enduring Originalism is “non-positivist
at the level of justificatory method, even if it tries to preserve a kind of
positivist originalism at the operative level.”232
Vermeule describes our approach as grounded on a “series of second-order propositions”:
(1) the common good requires that society coordinate on a settled,
stable, and adequately just constitutional framework for common
life; (2) within the space of determination, where the choice is
among reasonably just frameworks, the natural law does not take
sides, as it were, on questions like what the precise scope of presidential powers is, or whether judicial review is available for given
questions; and finally (3) applying originalism to such questions
provides the stability and durability of legal meanings that allow a
reasonably just framework to operate over time. 233

Vermeule then contends that “[t]he argument either fails to state
a view different than the classical law, or, to the extent that it is distinctive, fails on its own terms.”234
We count ourselves successful if we state a view that is no different
than the classical law and, to the extent our account is distinct from
Vermeule’s, we do not see that as a failing. Yet his description of our
work is imprecise and confusing. Vermeule misdescribes our theory
when he states it is grounded on “a series of second-order propositions.” Rather, as Part II shows, our approach to constitutionalism is
grounded in, and accounts for, the four crucial dimensions of law in
the classical tradition.235 Vermeule also fails to explain how our approach to human positive law, which is grounded in St. Thomas’s, is
“kind of positivist” at any level. In fact, his appreciation of the classical
tradition’s solicitude to positivity in law mirrors ours at times. Like us,
he holds that the master technique of the classical law is determination:
making and fixing reasoned choices for the common good among a
panoply of reasonable options. Deference to those determinations is
not positivism but rather, as Vermeule recognizes, “is essentially that
favorite tool of the classical lawyer.”236 As Professor Steven D. Smith
observed in his own review of Vermeule’s criticisms of us, it “would be
231 Id. at 108–09.
232 Id. at 109.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 See Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 7, at 120–26 (discussing the role the four causes
play in a theory of constitutionalism).
236 Id. at 46.
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more accurate and less tendentious simply to say that natural law
originalism is self-consciously ‘grounded in’ or ‘embedded in’ CLT
[classical legal theory]—in the position that Vermeule says legal thinkers should adopt and yet oddly wants to deny them.”237
Any differences between us and Vermeule in this respect show
how our understanding of American constitutional law is closer to the
classical tradition. Our approach to interpretation seeks to identify the
reasoned propositions an actual authority enacted in a promulgated
text, rather than ahistorical surface readings. Our approach also treats
our promulgated Constitution as a law—lex—rather than skipping past
it to engage in a Dworkinian constructive interpretation of our small-c
constitutional order. And, as we noted, Common Good Constitutionalism’s superficial approach to textualism facilitates this effacement of
posited law in the name of broader principles. We do not reject Vermeule’s notion that our constitutional order is permeated by unwritten
legal principles of ius. But in our polity these principles sit above, below, and around a written, posited Constitution. Not only do all of
these principles inform the law of the Constitution, but some also emanate from it. Vermeule does not seem to have a place in his legal
taxonomy for positive ius; his taxonomy of lex and ius seems at points
to map on to a distinction between positive law (lex) and nonpositive
law (ius). But just as natural law can be described as lex, so too can
positive right be described as ius. Because of the dependence of constitutional ius on constitutional lex, Vermeule’s account of common
good constitutionalism fails as an account of constitutional law of the
United States to the extent that he neglects the Constitution as lex. It
is our account of the Constitution that “puts positive law into a right
relationship with law generally.”238
At other times, Vermeule also seems skeptical about the possibility
of fixed determination of the legal Constitution at all. He repeats
Dworkin’s well-known level-of-generality objection that “the putative
fixation of original meaning by itself cannot guarantee durability.”239

237 Steven D. Smith, The Constitution, The Leviathan, and the Common Good, 37 CONST.
COMENT. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 18) (footnote omitted), http://ssrn.com/abstract=4098880; see also id. (“[T]here is no apparent reason why such originalism is any more
inherently positivistic or any more unstable (whatever that means) than the positivism Vermeule himself commends as part of CLT, or than the textualism that he sensibly approves.”).
238 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 108–09. We do not address in this Review the consequences of Vermeule’s imprecision in reintroducing ius to American constitutional theory
in the manner that he has. Caveat lector.
239 Id. at 110; see also id. (“Absent further normative judgment at the point of application, of the very sort [of normative judgment] the theory is intended to exclude, fixation of
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Dworkin’s argument is that there are always moral considerations at
the point of application, particularly in the choice about whether to
read a given provision at a low or high level of abstraction.240 Originalists have answers to that objection that Vermeule does not consider, let
alone rebut.241 More importantly for present purposes, any interestingly strong version of that argument undercuts Vermeule’s own
method. Again, like us, he holds that deference to reasonable, authoritative determinations is central to the classical tradition. But to defer,
even rebuttably, one must go back and discover the content of the reasoned choice that lawmaking authority fixed in place at a given time.
There is no determination without the ability to establish a reasoned
ordination. But if the Dworkinian level-of-generality objection renders
the quest for such original ordinances of reason as elusive as Vermeule
claims, determination in Common Good Constitutionalism itself is an illusion. There may be an attempt to “mix oil and water” here, but it is
not the combination of an originalist understanding of the law of the
Constitution with the classical legal tradition.242 Rather, it is Vermeule’s grafting of Dworkinian hermeneutical skepticism about the
limits of “fit” onto a classical framework that presumes the durability
of posited law. Any softer version of the argument—that it can sometimes be difficult to identify the original law that preexists interpretation—collapses into a classical framework that takes the positive law of
the promulgated Constitution seriously.243
B. Pressing the Limits of Originalism in Adjudication
Vermeule’s other objections to our classically grounded originallaw originalism press primarily on its purported incompleteness for
constitutional adjudication. This comes through in Vermeule’s argument that “[t]hose who apply the law must inevitably, in some domain

meaning does nothing to prevent the mutable, progressive form of ‘living originalism’ championed
by [Professor Jack] Balkin and others.”).
240 See id.
241 See, e.g., William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The “Common-Good” Manifesto, 136
HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2023) (reviewing VERMEULE, supra note 1) (discussing the objection and cataloging originalist arguments in response); John O. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning Fallacy, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 737. For a careful argument
that one can distinguish the immediate mischief a legal enactment sought to remedy from
the broader purposes, see Samuel L. Bray, The Mischief Rule, 109 GEO. L.J. 967 (2021).
242 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 2.
243 Vermeule could fall back and argue that identifying reasoned ordinances in sources
of law besides the Constitution is easier. But that is a contingent, debatable fact about our
legal order. A few invocations of the Constitution’s generalities and utter lack of interest
in probing for reasoned propositions beneath them does not get us there.

452

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 98:1

of cases, have recourse to general background principles of law and to
the natural law in order to decide how texts should best be read.”244
He says that we do not “clearly come to grips with the problem . . . [of]
‘hard cases,’ in which the rule the lawmaker prescribed for ordinary
cases is ambiguous, or is vague, or otherwise misfires—fails to track the
common good—due to unusual circumstances.”245
This is mostly a convenient way of changing the subject from how
best to understand the law of the Constitution. Elsewhere in the book,
Vermeule acknowledges that “[t]he classical tradition, in itself, does
not license judges in particular to rule as they see fit for the common
good. It takes no a priori position on questions like the appropriate
scope of judicial review . . . .”246 Vermeule insists that “the political morality of the common good itself includes role morality and division of
functions,” and he specifies further that “[h]ow the Constitution
should be interpreted and how judges should decide cases are not necessarily the same question.”247 But Vermeule’s criticism of original-law
originalism for supposedly running out in hard cases is not simply a
matter of the author of Chapter 3 ignoring what he said about role
morality and division of functions in Chapters 1 and 2. In an endnote,
Vermeule identifies as “[a] wrinkle” our expressed self-limitation of
having offered a theory of law rather than a theory of adjudication in
Enduring Originalism.248 He describes our adherence to the distinction
between these two different kinds of theories as confusing.249
244 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 111.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 19.
247 Id. at 43; see also id. (“[W]hile the promotion of the common good is a duty incumbent upon all officials in the system, legislators and executive officers as well as judges, as a
logical matter it does not follow that each official or institution in the system, taken separately, must make unfettered judgments about the common good for itself; the political
morality of the common good itself includes role morality and division of functions.”).
248 See id. at 215 n.292.
249 Id. One wonders to whom this clear distinction is confusing. After all, he recognizes the distinction himself. See supra notes 244–46 and accompanying text. Vermeule
asserts that we “trade on terms, like ‘originalism,’ that are usually offered as centrally relevant to adjudication.” VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 215 n.292. This confusion of his may
simply reflect unfamiliarity with or indifference to the extensive originalism scholarship
that has long distinguished between theories of interpretation and theories of adjudication.
See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Equivocal Originalism, 27 TEX. REV. L. & POL. (forthcoming 2022)
(manuscript at 1) (“Originalism-as-interpretation and originalism-as-adjudication ask very
different questions and may well call for application of different skill sets, decision procedures, evidence sets, and standards of proof.”); Mitchell N. Berman, Keeping Our Distinctions
Straight: A Response to Originalism: Standard and Procedure, 135 HARV. L. REV. F. 133, 134
(2022) (observing that this point “has been pressed vigorously by more than a few legal
philosophers and constitutional theorists especially over the past decade”); Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, Pluralistic Nonoriginalism and the Combinability Problem, 91 TEX. L. REV.
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But the distinction between a theory of law and a theory of adjudication is easy to apprehend. Different activities call for different
kinds of theories. The activities of ascertaining the law and of rendering judgment according to it are different activities and the relationship between the two is complex. This is not to say a theory of law is
unconnected to adjudication. A theory of law plays a crucial, anchoring role in determining what makes easy cases easy, hard cases hard,
and which arguments are more probable when cases are close.250 Even
so, adjudication is not limited to the identification of a particular piece
of positive law.
To illustrate the distinction between the activities of ascertaining
the law, and of rendering judgment according to it, let us consider a
couple of constitutional classics, beginning with Marbury v. Madison.251
There, Chief Justice John Marshall and the Supreme Court declined
to order Madison to deliver Marbury his commission as justice of the
peace. This was not because Chief Justice Marshall was confused about
how to carry out his judicial duty to render to each his due. Among
the principles Chief Justice Marshall invoked in resolving the case were
two variations on the classical legal maxim ubi ius, ibi remedium.252 Indeed, Marshall determined not only that Marbury had a vested legal
right to his commission, but also that a writ of mandamus directed to
the Secretary of State to compel its delivery was an appropriate remedy.253 The Court nonetheless dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because the grant of statutory jurisdiction to the Court exceeded
a constitutional ceiling for original jurisdiction purportedly in Article
III.254 Interpreting and applying the relevant legal materials to ascertain Marbury’s right under the law was a distinct activity from rendering judgment according to the whole law, including that specifying the
limits of judicial power.

1739, 1748–49 (2013) (distinguishing the activity of “finding out what the constitutional
law is” from “the wider question of how judges should decide constitutional cases”). Or it
just might have served Vermeule’s rhetorical purposes.
250 We can contrast this with Vermeule’s approach, which speaks of the need to “fit”
the legal materials without explaining what is in the legal materials that an interpreter
should fit an interpretation with. See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 69.
251 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
252 See id. at 163 (“[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal
right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.”);
id. (“[I]t is a settled and invariable principle in the laws of England, that every right, when
withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.”).
253 Id. at 155–73.
254 Id. at 173–80.
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A second illustrative example is Gibbons v. Ogden.255 This was a
dispute over the right to run steamboat passenger ferries on New York
waters.256 Ogden claimed an exclusive right based on New York state
laws granting him a monopoly.257 Gibbons contested this on two
grounds.258 He contended, first, that New York law granting exclusivity
to Ogden was unconstitutional because the power to regulate commerce is exclusively federal, and second, that the federal license Gibbons had obtained under a federal law regulating the coasting trade
overrode any exclusivity granted by state law.259 The Supreme Court
ruled for Gibbons on the grounds that his license under a valid federal
law, combined with the Supremacy Clause, overrode the state-law grant
of exclusivity.260 This was the second ground advanced by Gibbons.
Much of Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court discusses the
first ground, though he ultimately left that issue of constitutional law
unresolved. This was not because Marshall had any difficulty deploying originalist reasoning to answer questions about the reach of the
Commerce Clause.261 Nor was it because Marshall thought it appropriate to decide or explain the absolute minimum necessary to resolve the
case.262 Nor did Marshall shy away from addressing the question of

255 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
256 Id. at 1–2.
257 Id.
258 Id. at 2.
259 Id. at 2–3.
260 Id. at 240.
261 See, e.g., id. at 188–89 (“As men, whose intentions require no concealment, generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey,
the enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must
be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what
they have said. If, from the imperfection of human language, there should be serious
doubts respecting the extent of any given power, it is a well settled rule, that the objects for
which it is given, especially when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself, should
have great influence in the construction.”); id. at 190 (“All America understands, and has
uniformly understood, the word ‘commerce,’ to comprehend navigation. It was so understood, and must have been so understood, when the constitution was framed. The power
over commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary objects for which the people
of America adopted their government . . . .”).
262 See e.g., id. at 221–22 (“The Court is aware that, in stating the train of reasoning by
which we have been conducted to this result, much time has been consumed in the attempt
to demonstrate propositions which may have been thought axioms. It is felt that the tediousness inseparable from the endeavour to prove that which is already clear, is imputable
to a considerable part of this opinion. But it was unavoidable. The conclusion to which we
have come, depends on a chain of principles which it was necessary to preserve unbroken;
and, although some of them were thought nearly self-evident, the magnitude of the question, the weight of character belonging to those from whose judgment we dissent, and the
argument at the bar, demanded that we should assume nothing.”).
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federal exclusivity because it had not been adequately aired or because
he had no inclinations regarding the right answer.263 Rather, Marshall
exercised his judicial discretion to leave the issue unresolved because
the duty to render judgment in the case did not require its resolution;
adjudication is a distinct activity from ascertaining the law.
The more recent case of Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization264 provides a textbook illustration of the difference between (i) answering a question of what the Constitution, correctly understood, provides; and (ii) deciding how to rule in the face of inconsistency between a correct understanding of the Constitution, on the one hand,
and decades-old decisions interpreting the Constitution incorrectly,
on the other. The distinction between these two questions in Dobbs is
but one of the many ways in which courts regularly encounter the more
general distinction between the activities of (i) ascertaining the best
understanding of the Constitution as law, and (ii) rendering judgment
in a case according to all applicable law.
Dobbs concerned whether to affirm or reverse a lower-court decision that held unconstitutional a state law providing: “Except in a medical emergency or in the case of a severe fetal abnormality, a person
shall not intentionally or knowingly perform . . . or induce an abortion
of an unborn human being if the probable gestational age of the unborn human being has been determined to be greater than fifteen
(15) weeks.”265 Lower federal courts had held this law unconstitutional
under the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade266 and its 1992
decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.267
The Supreme Court not only reversed the judgment of unconstitutionality under review but also entirely overruled Roe and Casey. Justice
Alito wrote the opinion of the Court on behalf of a five-Justice majority.
Chief Justice Roberts joined in the reversal of the lower-court judgment but dissented from the majority’s complete repudiations of Roe
and Casey. Three dissenting justices would have affirmed both the
lower court judgment and the Court’s precedents.
Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court begins “by considering the
critical question whether the Constitution, properly understood, confers a right to obtain an abortion.”268 Quoting Chief Justice Marshall’s
263 See id. at 209–10 (stating with respect to the argument for federal exclusivity that
“[t]here is great force in this argument, and the Court is not satisfied that it has been refuted”).
264 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022).
265 MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-191 (2022).
266 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
267 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
268 Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2244.
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1824 opinion for the Court in Gibbons v. Ogden and Justice Story’s 1833
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, the opinion’s analysis
opens by stating: “Constitutional analysis must begin with ‘the language of the instrument’ [Gibbons], which offers a ‘fixed standard’
[Story’s Commentaries] for ascertaining what our founding document
means.”269 Finding no reference to an abortion right in the Constitution, Dobbs considered whether it was implicit in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Rather than treat “liberty” as an
invitation to read in moral content,270 the Court surveyed the history
and tradition of abortion law up to ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment and found it implausible to conclude that it implicitly included any such right.271 Recognizing the stabilizing function of precedent, the Court then considered whether Roe and Casey’s departure
from the Constitution’s original law merited the protection of stare decisis.272 After doing so at length, it decided to overrule those decisions
and order judgment on the basis of its understanding of the allocation
of authority in the Constitution.
The dissenting Justices followed a similar two-step approach but
reversed the ordering of the steps and arrived at opposite outcomes
under both. After first finding Roe and Casey to be decisions that “are
rooted in—and themselves led to—other rights giving individuals control over their bodies and their most personal and intimate associations,”273 the dissenters next explained why Roe and Casey should be
understood as authorized interpretations of “the majestic but openended words of the Fourteenth Amendment—the guarantees of ‘liberty’ and ‘equality’ for all.”274
The point here is not to relitigate Dobbs. Our initial purpose in
invoking the decision has been to illustrate the familiar distinction
269 Id. at 2244–45 (first citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 186–89 (1824);
and then citing 1 STORY, supra note 192 § 399, at 305).
270 See id. at 2247 (stating “the term ‘liberty’ alone provides little guidance” and warning “we must guard against the natural human tendency to confuse what that Amendment
protects with our own ardent views about the liberty that Americans should enjoy”).
271 See id. at 2248–53. Although the Court emphasized abortion law up to 1868, its
conclusion that abortion was not a deeply rooted tradition also considered postratification
practice and assumed “for the sake of argument” that the specific practices of states at ratification do not “mar[k] the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty.” Id. at 2258
(quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 848).
272 See id. at 2261–78. That approach was consistent with that of natural law originalists
like Lee Strang who argue that precedent should play an important role in constitutional
adjudication. See STRANG, supra note 229, at 91.
273 Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2320 (Breyer, Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ., dissenting).
274 Id. at 2326. Although the dissent places “equality” in quotation marks in describing
the “open-ended words of the Fourteenth Amendment,” that word is not actually one of
the “words of the Fourteenth Amendment,” id. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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between (i) ascertaining what the Constitution requires and (ii) rendering judgment according to all applicable law, including not only
judicial precedent that departs from the law of the Constitution but
also law concerning how to approach such departures. In addition to
illustrating the distinction, attending to Dobbs also serves two additional
purposes in this critique of Vermeule’s Common Good Constitutionalism
and comparative commendation of Enduring Originalism. One is to
suggest the relative attractiveness of our respective approaches in action. That is implicit enough in what we have written already.
Another purpose of adverting to Dobbs here is to address a distinct
objection that Vermeule levels against classically grounded original-law
originalism. This is the charge of disruption. Vermeule contends that
originalism’s claims of continuity are illusory, and he excoriates its reformist vices. His genealogy of modern originalism emphasizes its “disruptive, occasionally even revolutionary quality.”275 He contrasts
originalism’s claims of stability through enduring legal meaning over
time with its destabilizing potential in constitutional adjudication today.276 He decries originalism as “an essentially Protestant method of
hermeneutic that, taken to its logical extreme, invokes sola scriptura to
unsettle doctrines long established in the law.”277 Originalism is not
about fidelity to established law, according to Vermeule, but “[a]s with
the Protestantism it instantiates, originalism is at bottom a mode of
rebellion against an established order and its developing doctrine.”278
By contrast, Vermeule claims continuity with the classical legal tradition that truly grounds our constitutional order. Indeed, he seeks to
restore our order to its fullness after a period of originalist- and progressive-induced amnesia.279
But Vermeule also calls for change. Immediately after criticizing
originalism’s doctrinal iconoclasm Vermeule hastens to add, “[t]his is
not, of course, to say that disruption is necessarily bad—it depends on
what is being disrupted, and why.”280 This qualifier makes sense in
light of his prescriptions for constitutional adjudication. In the book’s
Conclusion, Vermeule advocates for precisely the kind of disruption
that originalism—in his view—offers. Shredding Dworkin’s famous

275 See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 93; see also id. (“[O]riginalism was initially created
in order to unsettle the evolving doctrine of the Warren and Burger Courts, which conservatives despised. Disruption was baked into originalism from the beginning.”).
276 Id. at 113 (“The idea is that originalism conduces to stability and durability over
time, but there is little reason to think this is true.”).
277 Id.
278 Id. at 113–14.
279 Id. at 1–3, 118.
280 Id. at 114.
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analogy of legal interpretation, Vermeule asserts that “[t]he last few
chapters of a long chain novel have to be partly ripped up, partly reinterpreted in drastic terms.”281 Going even further than originalism
would authorize, and indeed directly against the continuity-with-origins that serves as originalism’s ballast, the title of Vermeule’s group
blog heralds iustitium. This is a Roman-law term meaning a “suspension of normal juridical proceedings” that the blog’s founders “extend[] by analogy to refer to the kind of action that is necessary when
the juridical establishment has become corrupt.”282
We sympathize with the sentiment, and we recognize the realities
underlying its grim assessment. But we reject recourse to rupture. This
rejection is necessarily provisional, but we believe it appropriate to repeat right now. After all, the claim of corruption was put even more
strongly by the author of the opinion for the Court in Dobbs. Writing
seven years earlier in dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges, Justice Alito lamented “the deep and perhaps irremediable corruption of our legal
culture’s conception of constitutional interpretation.”283 Yet Justice
Alito did not surrender then (thank goodness), and neither do we.
Vermeule is right that originalism-in-adjudication can disrupt an
established order. But it does so under the banner of longer-term continuity. Our distinction between developments and departures in Enduring Originalism serves a similar function as Vermeule’s later-drawn
distinction between (good) developing constitutionalism and (bad)
progressive living constitutionalism. Every theory of how to implement
the law of the Constitution requires an account of change-within-continuity. Although we did not offer a theory of adjudication in Enduring
Originalism and have not done so in this critique, our account of original law and its interpretation lays the groundwork for one that brings
the original law “off the shelf, returned from exile, substituted in from
the sidelines, or whatever you like”284 in a way that is not available for
other rules that lack such pedigree.
Implementation of classically grounded original-law originalism
across time also offers a particular kind of transtemporal stability. For
cases of first impression, it can inform reasonably just positive-law answers to emerging questions of constitutional law—answers continuous
with the ongoing constitutional order in which these questions
emerge. Furthermore, when such originalism is deeply rooted in the
practices of adjudication, it reduces the expected value of deliberate
deviations from original law that has not been lawfully changed. This
281 Id. at 181.
282 About Us, IUS & IUSTITIUM, https://iusetiustitium.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc
/2P26-LGW9].
283 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 742 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).
284 Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 7, at 152.
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flows from the recognition that later interpreters will be authorized to
review the deviation and to call back into action the original, unlawfully displaced law. As Dobbs demonstrates, original-law originalism can
show that juridical deeds like Roe and Casey have clouded claims of title.
The vulnerability of such decisions to revision or overruling, moreover,
increases to the extent they are recognizably out of place within the
broader framework of positive law and the traditions and practices of
the polity. Adjudication anchored to the original law does not slough
off doctrine through facile proof-texting. Rather it aspires to identify
the propositions of law that were made true by the enacted text in time
and, where prudent, just, and authorized by other applicable law, make
contemporary practice more continuous with those original commitments.
CONCLUSION
Having considered both areas of agreement and disagreement
with Vermeule, it is fitting to consider where to go from here. Vermeule addresses this question in Common Good Constitutionalism by forcing a choice among three alternatives: “positivist originalism”; “progressive living constitutionalism”; and “common good constitutionalism.” Having exposed the limits of this false trilemma, we believe we
have also revealed the staying power of Enduring Originalism. That
said, we do not wish to repeat in reverse one of the least attractive aspects of Vermeule’s constitutional dialectic. That is simply to privilege
one essential element of legality above all others and assert “the game
is up” once one’s interlocutor acknowledges the essential role of that
element.285 Rather, we encourage jurists to aim to understand constitutional law (and all human positive law, for that matter) in the light
of all four of law’s four causes.286
Vermeule is right that understanding human law rightly always depends explicitly or implicitly upon some notion of the common good;
285 This is what Vermeule does with Casey in asserting that “the game is up” for
originalism rooted in the classical natural law once one “allows interpreters to consider
broader principles of legal morality (ius) in hard cases.” Casey & Vermeule, supra note 181,
at 127–28. At that point, they insist, “one is merely arguing over the precise scope of discretion for interpreters in what is essentially a regime of common-good constitutionalism.”
Id. at 128.
286 Based on Vermeule’s responses to other critical reviews of Common Good Constitutionalism, the rhetorical attractiveness of the tu quoque seems sufficiently strong that some
version of “overemphasis on the Constitution as lex” and “overemphasis on promulgation”
is likely to feature prominently in any sustained reply he makes to us. In anticipatory defense, we plead the particularities of our legal Constitution as understood within a classical
law framework as well as the importance of all four causes.
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the same is true of reasoned ordering, authority, and promulgation.
He underestimates, in our view, the common ground handed forward
from the past for arguing over the actual instantiations of these essential elements within our polity today. These are the particulars of constitutional text, constitutional history, and constitutional tradition, all
understood within a framework of the continuity of the United States
of America as a political unit. In his new theory’s best moments,
though, Vermeule’s views converge with ours as previously expressed
with respect to the relationship between American constitutional positivity and legal positivism.287
Yet despite this shared framework, we suspect we are engaged in
very different enterprises. Vermeule’s highly abstract notion of continuity with the original Constitution and its order suggests that he may
be more interested in laying the theoretical foundation for a new order
than in identifying the law of this one. All told, the book seems less a
classical approach to our actual Constitution than a permission structure for a new and improved constitutional order. In this respect, the
best reading of Vermeule’s two-level approach in Common Good Constitutionalism is one between the lines.288
On continuity, Vermeule contends that common good constitutionalism “embodies the best of our own tradition” and that the classical law “is the original understanding” that we must recover.289 If we
understand common good constitutionalism in its abstract, generic
form, that is true as far as it goes. The notions that “law should be seen
as a reasoned ordering to the common good” of a “flourishing political
community” by political officials acting “in a manner consistent with
requirements of their particular roles”290 strike us as, well, “banalities,
truisms, universally understood and accepted by all remotely sensible
legal systems.”291 When Common Good Constitutionalism descends from
unassailable generalities, though, the case for continuity is far weaker.
This weakness is a direct function of the book’s abstract, constructive,
Dworkinian interpretation of our small-c constitutional order and its

287 Compare, e.g., Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 7, at 117 (“To understand the importance of positivity—the need for human-created law despite its imperfections—we must
go beyond positivism in theorizing about constitutional interpretation.”), with, e.g., VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 18 (“Properly speaking, the classical approach to law is not an opponent or alternative to originalism or textualism. . . . The classical conception of ius
civile . . . can be summed up as positive law without jurisprudential positivism.”).
288 See generally ARTHUR M. MELZER, PHILOSOPHY BETWEEN THE LINES: THE LOST HISTORY OF ESOTERIC WRITING (2014).
289 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 2.
290 Id. at 1.
291 Casey & Vermeule, supra note 136.
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neglect of our actual Constitution as lex worth interpreting in its own
right and that shapes and particularizes surrounding ius.
Vermeule’s discussion of the body of legal thought surrounding
the origins of our constitutional order is instructive. As other reviewers
have noted, Common Good Constitutionalism discusses Ulpian, Bartolus,
Aquinas, John Henry Newman, and Giovano Botero, but never mentions Edward Coke, John Locke, Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, or Joseph Story.292 St. Thomas Aquinas is a profound influence on our general jurisprudential approach, and we are
hardly card-carrying members of the Locke or Jefferson fan clubs. But
if one, like Vermeule, claims to have captured the original understanding of a constitutional order that particularizes a generic form of classical legal constitutionalism, one should at least account for the law
shaped by that original understanding. (Other postliberals would contend that, given its liberal founding, the United States is one of the
worst candidates for embodying the classical tradition, but that is a debate for another day.)293
Moving on from the Founding, the case for continuity does not
improve. Recall the three examples that compose his affirmative argument that his rendition of the classical tradition is the best reading of
our constitutional order: (a) a misinterpretation of a 1905 Supreme
Court dissent in Lochner;294 (b) Ronald Dworkin’s favorite statutory interpretation case, from the New York Court of Appeals in 1889, no
less;295 and (c) a 1936 Supreme Court foreign affairs opinion that even
nonoriginalists think is a poorly reasoned outlier.296 Marbury v. Madison, Gibbons v. Ogden, and Barron v. Baltimore, to select a few canonical
cases, make no appearance. McCulloch v. Maryland (again, misdescribed as a Commerce Clause case) is selectively cited to bolster the
notion of a de facto federal police power.297
We are not the first to note the book’s lack of engagement with
the actual Constitution and its surrounding jurisprudence.298 To be
292 Baude & Sachs, supra note 241 (manuscript at 33).
293 See, e.g., PATRICK J. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED 101 (2018) (describing the
U.S. Constitution as “the ‘applied technology’ of liberal theory” and the “embodiment of a
set of modern principles that sought to overturn ancient teachings and shape a distinctly
different modern human”).
294 VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 60–71 (discussing Harlan’s dissent in Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
295 Id. at 71–84 (discussing Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889)).
296 Id. at 84–89 (discussing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936)); see supra note 201 and accompanying text.
297 See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 40.
298 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Liberalism, Republicanism, and Common Good Constitutionalism, BALKINIZATION (July 7, 2022), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2022/07/liberalism-
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fair, this is not a long book, and every theoretical exposition implicitly
chooses between focal cases and peripheral ones. The principles of
selection here, however, appear indifferent to most chapters of the
American constitutional law canon at least until we arrive at the twentieth century. At that point the book offers continuity with selected
areas of more recent jurisprudence, including those protecting state
police power,299 expansive federal power (especially compared to
states),300 the central role of the administrative state in governance,301
and a strong executive.302 American constitutional law is a complex
story, but it is understandable if one concludes that the most substantial element of continuity in the book is with Vermeule’s earlier writings on constitutionalism and the administrative state.
What next? A major impetus for Vermeule’s writing is the belief
that the Constitution in the hands of the legal establishment since the
1960s or 1970s has been a blunt instrument for imposing a secular liberal or libertarian order hostile to the common good of the people of
the United States. Common Good Constitutionalism accordingly seeks to
tear out the last few chapters of our constitutional story. Vermeule
subjects Obergefell v. Hodges303 to a withering critique for ignoring the

republicanism-and-common.html [https://perma.cc/7C5N-JHYZ] (“Vermeule has surprisingly little to say about constitutional structure or about the various clauses of the U.S. Constitution.”); Baude & Sachs, supra note 241 (manuscript at 13–14); Matthew J. Franck,
Calvinball Constitutionalism, PUB. DISCOURSE (May 3, 2022), https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2022/05/82092/ [https://perma.cc/XYZ3-Y2DW] (“Vermeule, the holder of
an endowed chair in constitutional law, has relatively little to say about the Constitution in
this book on constitutionalism, or about the history of its adoption and interpretation.”);
Smith, supra note 237 (manuscript at 11) (“[W]hile wanting to revive the classical legal
tradition, Vermeule has little use for the more specific classical tradition of American constitutional law.”).
299 See, e.g., VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 61, 79–80 (discussing Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11 (1905)); id. at 124–28 (discussing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926)).
300 Compare id. at 33 (first citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819);
and then citing Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944)) (“[T]he
scope of federal powers has become all but equivalent to a general police power in substance . . . .”)), with id. at 158–59 (sniffing at “so-called ‘federalism’” and contending
“American states as such are poorly situated to promote the relevant values”).
301 See, e.g., id. at 151–54 (discussing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); and Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), and arguing that administrative agencies are
crucial for implementing federal and natural law).
302 See, e.g., id. at 42 (arguing “our . . . constitutional order has developed to center on
a powerful presidency”); id. at 151 (concluding that “[a]gencies are in this sense the living
voice of our positive law”).
303 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
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“powerful evidence of the ius gentium and ius naturale.”304 He also contends that in substantial part “[l]ibertarian conceptions of property
rights and economic rights will also have to go.”305 In his penultimate
Applications chapter, he seeks to read down the “pernicious” doctrine
of state sovereignty to mere principles of “respect and comity,”306 rein
in free speech doctrine,307 and liberalize standing doctrine to advance
environmental protection.308 He is more laconic on abortion jurisprudence. Although Casey’s subjectivist rhetoric should be “stamped as
abominable, beyond the realm of the acceptable forever after,”309 he
leaves his substantive discussion of the issue to a single endnote.310 To
be fair, Vermeule wrote Common Good Constitutionalism before Dobbs
and other important decisions from the Supreme Court’s most recent
Term were decided. But Dobbs’ rejection of Casey and Roe complicates
Vermeule’s unargued-for assumption that original-law originalism is
inadequate for rewriting the chapters he wishes to rip out.
Now, not everything will break for classically oriented critics of
corrupted elements of the American constitutional order. The original law will not give you everything you want or prevent everything you
fear. And even when it does, there remain prudential judgments about
whether to return the original law to its rightful place in adjudication.
The answers to these morally laden questions of lex, ius, and prudence
call for careful jurists in the mold of Marshall and Story to undertake,
with patience, thoroughness, and determination, the difficult lawyers’
work of maintaining the law of the Constitution. Natural lawyers working in the classical tradition in this constitutional order must decide
whether that effort is worth it and whether the law of the Constitution
we discover, that mixture of bitter, bland, and sweet, merits our obedience to its reasonable ordinances for the common good, as promulgated.
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VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 131.
Id. at 42.
See id. at 158.
See id. at 167–73.
See id. at 174–77.
Id. at 42.
See id. at 199 n.103.

